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REPORT OF 

AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION 

TO EUROPE 




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G!ass_SAM_ 

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Report of AGRICULTURAL 
COMMISSION to Europe 



Observations Made by American ^ ^ 

-7539 
Agriculturists in Great Britain, 

France, and Italy for the United 

States Department of Agriculture 




WASHINGTON, D. C, JANUARY 17, 1919 



.ILL) 



CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Outstanding Pacts 3 

Report of W. O. Thompson, Chairman 7 

Individual Reports: 

R. A. Pearson 16 

Wm. A. Taylor 35 

George M. Rommel 48 

Thomas F. Hunt 64 

David R. Coker 80 

George R. Argo 83 

Suggestions and Recommendations 87 



n. of ->. 



REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



OUTSTANDING FACTS. 

IT IS DIFFICULT to summarize the reports of the Agricultural 
Commission to Europe because they contain so many facts that in 
order to comprehend the whole situation one must read the reports 
in detail. Moreover, the observations were made prior to the armistice, 
which was signed on November 11, and the purpose of the visit was 
to ascertain conditions of European agriculture as they related to the 
agriculture of the United States under a continuance of the war. The 
Commission arrived in Liverpool on September 5, and, returning, 
sailed from Liverpool on October 29. In some respects, therefore, the 
reports lose interest except for their historical value, but for the 
most part the data, the suggestions, and the recommendations possess 
large economic value in appraising agricultural responsibilities in the 
United States for the year 1919 and for the years immediately follow- 
ing, and they exhibit some new angles of mutual responsibility and 
interest. 

Some of the outstanding facts are : 

Great Britain's war agriculture in 1918 increased her home-grown 
bread supplies fourfold. 

The reports for tlie harvest of 1918 indicate that in the matter of 
hreadstuffs England could supply Jierself forty weeks of the year 
as against ten weeks in 1916. — Thompson. 

France's production of foods decreased sharply, especially in sugar 
beets, which were grown principally in the northern area, where the 
ravages of war were greatest. 

Prior to the war France was producing about 800,000 tons of 
sugar and consunving atout 600,000 tons. * * * The present 
production of France amounts to aJjout 250,000 tons, or possibly 
with favored c^'op it may run to 300,000 tons. — Thompson. 

France's production of breadstuflfs also declined, though the pro- 
duction of 1918 was somewhat better than the production of 1914. 

In Italy there has been some reduction of the cultivated area, but 
except for wheat the reduction in the volume of breadstuffs has not 
•been very serious. 

The yield per acre also has decreased, tJie two chief direct 

codises being shortage of fertiliser and uncontrolled grotvth of 

weeds. — Pearson. 

3 



4 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

Italy's wheat production in 1918 was estimated at 43,000,000 quin- 
tals (220 pounds) compared with 46,153,000 quintals in 1914. 

LIVE STOCK. 

Great Britain has maintained her herds of cattle and has increased 
her sheep and made small losses in hogs. All cattle in 1914 numbered 
12,184,505, and in 1917, 12,382,230 ; hogs declined something more than 
900,000. Horses in 1914 were 2,237,783 and in 1917 2,190,318. Com- 
plete figures for 1918 were not available, but so far as ascertained they 
did not indicate material variation from the figures of 1917. 

Sheep w^re declining in Great Britain 'before the war for the 
same reasons as existed in the United States. They have increased 
in nuTYibers since the beginning of the mar on account of the in- 
crease in the prices of tvool and meat. — Rommel. 

In France all live stock has declined. The comparative figures on 
December 31, 1913, and on June 30, 1917, are as follows: 

1913. 1917. 

Cattle 14,787,710 12,443,304 

Sheep 16,131,390 10,586,594 

Hogs 7,035,850 4,200,280 

Horses 3,231,000 2,283,000 

However, France has maintained her j^ung cattle. Her ''breeders" 
over one year in 1913 numbered 2,853,650, and under one year 2,112,440. 
The same classes in 1917 were 2,677,870 and 2,01 6,800. The decline in 
sheep is most serious, while there is a sharp decline in hogs. 

Sufficient supplies of breeding stock tcill probaMy remain in any 
event to permit fairly rapid replacement afer the toar. — Rommel. 

Italy's cattle have declined from 7,100,000 in 1914 to 6,155,419 in 
1918, but her calves have increased from 1,600,000 in 1914 to 1,801,808 
in 1918. 

Many orders have been in effect for tJie purpose of conserving 
live stock. For example, in some sections calves weighing less than 
440 pounds could not be slaughtered. In other sections tJie mini- 
mum limit toas 120 pounds. — Pearson. 

Similar restrictions were applied to the slaughtering of sheep and 
hogs. Italy's present estimated needs are 1,000,000 cows and 500,000 
oxen. Sheep have slightly increased since 1908 and are now about 
11,000,000, substantially the same as in 1914. Hogs have been greatly 
decreased. 

Generally speaking. Great Britain, France, and Italy will need to 
import for some time to come large supplies of meats, fats, dairy prod- 



OUTSTANDING FACTS. 5 

ucts, and concentrates for animals. Some importations of live stock 
for breeding purposes may be made, but for the most part importations 
will consist of live-stock products. In France and Italy the preserva- 
tion of young animals gives promise of comparatively early restoration 
of both dairy and beef herds, and the general thought of producers 
there is that their present basis stock is the best adapted for their 
purposes. 

SEEDS. 

At the time of the Commission's observations the seed situation for 
1919 appeared to be very acute, both as to supply and effective distribu- 
tion. This situation perhaps will be intensified as to supply by the 
demands of the devastated regions which are now released for normal 
activities, but distribution will perhaps be considerably improved. 

Unless through pro^npt international action the approwimate 
stocks and requirements of the vitally important seeds for each 
country can he determined as a hasis for the adnvinistration of the 
existing ex^port restricting regulations in force in the several 
countries ivith respect to seeds, the prospect for prompt restora- 
tion of normal production in several of he countries toill he seri- 
ously impaired. The existing conditions tend to favor the forcing 
of seed prices to destructive high points and thus to endanger the 
welfare of our otvn farmers as well as thousands of the allied 
countries. — Taylor. 

One of the distinctive agricultural advances made by Great Britain 
was the "Testing of Seeds" order, under which sellers of agricultural 
seeds are required to declare the purity and germination of seeds 
offered for sale. 

The law is applicable to farmers tvho sell .seed except that 
farmers may sell seeds as "gromn" to merchants tvithout having 
a test made, in such case merely stating tJie name of the variety. — 
Taylor. 

The act met with the hearty cooperation of the British seed trade. 

NEEDS. 

In addition to the live-stock products already mentioned. Great 
Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium will need to import for some time 
to come large supplies of wheat, fertilizers, fibers (wool and cotton), 
and farm machinery. All countries under review have made marked 
progress in the utilization of farm machinery, especially in the use 
of tractors. 



6 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

War practices in agriculture have interfered to a considerable 
degree with established methods of crop rotation and soil building. 
While these observations were made during active war and look for- 
ward to a continuation of war through 1919, they apply in large part 
to the farming operations of the spring and summer of 1919, for the 
reason that demobilization, the restoration of transportation, and the 
return to normal conditions can not be immediately effected. 



REPORT OF W. O. THOMPSON^ CHAIRMAN. 



REPORT OF W. O. THOMPSON, CHAIRMAN. 



My Dear Mr. Secretary : 

In August, 1918, it was your pleasure to appoint a commission to 
visit Europe for the purpose primarily of studying the agricultural 
conditions in England, France, and Italy. The commission was con- 
stituted as follows: Mr. Carl R. Vrooman, Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture, Washington; Mr. R. A. Pearson, President, The Iowa 
State College of Agriculture, Ames, Iowa ; Mr. W. A. Taylor, Chief of 
the Bureau of Plant Industry, Washington; Mr. George M. Rommel, 
Chief of the Division of Animal Husbandry, Washington ; Mr. Thomas 
F. Hunt, Dean of the College of Agriculture, University of California, 
Berkeley ; Mr. David R. Coker, Cotton Grower, Hartsville, S. C. ; Mr. 
George R. Argo, of the Bureau of Markets, Washington ; and Mr. W. O. 
Thompson, President, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. Mr. John 
F. Wilmeth, of the Bureau of Markets, was assigned to serve as secre- 
tary, clerk, and business manager of the commission. It is a pleasure to 
report that the services of Mr. Wilmeth were painstaking, accurate, 
and acceptable. It would be diflQcult for any person to satisfy the 
demands of such a position more exactly or acceptably than did he. 

TERM OF SERVICE. 

The Commission went on board ship on August 23, sailed August 
24, arrived in Liverpool September 5, and proceeded that same evening 
to London. The time of the Commission was divided between England 
and France, although Mr. Pearson made a journey to Italy and Mr, 
Rommel made a journey into Scotland. The Commission went on 
board ship at Liverpool, Tuesday, October 29, left the harbor in the 
morning, Wednesday, October 30, arrived in New York harbor the 
evening of Monday, November 4, and landed Tuesday morning, Novem- 
ber 5, returning to Washington that afternoon. 

, RECEPTION OF THE COMMISSION. 

Upon arrival in London the Commission reported to the United 
States Embassy and was accorded the usual courtesies and attention. 
Later the Commission reported to the Honorable R. E. Prothero, Min- 
ister of Agriculture, who received us most cordially and made pro- 
vision for our study of agriculture by putting at our disposal the ser- 
vices of his oflQce, Through the kindness of Sir Daniel Hall, Secretary 
to the Minister of Agriculture, and Mr, W, E, Walters, Secretary to 
Sir Daniel Hall, an itinerary was prepared and, at the request of the 



8 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

Board of Agriculture, the War Office provided the Commission with 
automobiles and drivers free of expense, so that the Commission spent 
approximately two weeks in visiting the rural districts of East and 
West England, and studied the conditions of agriculture at first hand 
and by interviews with farmers, land owners, stock growers, and 
others interested in the practices of agriculture. 

In France, after calling upon the United States Embassy and M. 
Victor Boret, the Minister of Agriculture, we were assigned to Mr. 
Henry Girard, Inspector General of Agriculture, and Count Le Marois, 
a military officer, who served as hosts for the Commission. These 
gentlemen arranged at the expense of the French government for 
military officers, automobiles, hotel accommodations, and every pos- 
sible convenience so that the Commission was able to spend practically 
two weeks in visiting the representative rural portions of France 
within reasonable distance from Paris. In addition to this, the 
British, French, and American military officials arranged for auto- 
mobile service and guides by which the Commission was able to visit 
the three battle fronts and to see a large portion of the devastated areas 
of the invaded territories. 

In addition to these official courtesies the Commission was most 
cordially received and welcomed by the officials of Oxford and Cam- 
bridge, England ; by Director E. J. Russell of the Rothamstead Experi- 
ment Station, Harpenden, who gave the Commission a most profitable 
and instructive day ; by the Institute of Agronomy, Paris ; by the Agri- 
cultural School at Grignon; by the Academy of Agriculture, Paris, 
which presented the members of the Commission with a specially 
prepared medal for the occasion ; and by the National Farmers Society 
of France and by numerous other officials not representing secieties 
but engaged in agricultural service. Individual citizens of both Eng- 
land and France were extremely cordial in greeting the Commission 
and putting at its disposal any information in their possession. The 
Commission takes pleasure in recording its high appreciation of all 
these services and courtesies. 

METHODS OF WORK. 

After some discussion the Commission decided that as a method of 
procedure it would as a whole make certain tours and visits for pur^ 
poses of observation, and that each individual under these circum- 
stances would be entirely free to prepare his own comments upon the 
observations. It was further decided that in individual instances, men 
should make personal investigation of topics in which they were more 
or less experienced. This enabled the Commission to specialize its 
inqwiries with certain members of the Commission and to compare 



REPORT OF W. O. THOMPSON^ CHAIRMAN. 9 

observations so as to bring the net result of substantial agreement upon 
all the more important observations and conclusions. Accordinglj, a 
journey was made in automobiles by a portion of the Commission up 
the western counties of England and another portion on a journey up 
through the eastern counties. Certain shorter journeys were made 
within reasonable distances in automobiles from the city of London. 

In France the same method of procedure followed. It was the 
privilege of the Commission to visit the Percheron district; the Bor- 
deaux district, where the grape grovring industry is at its maximum 
efficiency ; the Normandy district, where we had the opportunity to see 
and learn of the cattle industry; and the Lannes district where the 
French government has about 2,000,000 acres of land devoted to for- 
estry. This movement was projected as early as 1785, although active 
development of the forests did not occur until about 1860. The chief 
purpose in this area was the protection of the inlands from the en- 
croachments of the ocean. The sand dunes are in some places several 
hundred feet high. The French government has in this great asset 
ordinarily a source of resin for commercial purposes, and later a 
source of lumber. The government has realized, therefore, not only 
protection for the farm land within, but has made this strip along the 
ocean a source of profitable revenue for an indefinite period. At 
present the timber is being used as war material, with the French, 
Canadian, and American governments all engaged in cutting timber 
for such needs as the war program develops. 

The visit to the three battle fronts enabled the Commission to see 
with some vividness the wanton destruction of this war upon the agri- 
cultural areas of Northern France. This destruction has affected the 
crop production ; destroyed a large amount of agricultural machinery ; 
depopulated villages and cities; taken away a large amount of indus- 
trial machinery; utterly demolished buildings; scattered the terri- 
tory over with barbed-wire defenses and other obstructions that make 
the land and thC'entire area an object of great expense in order to 
restore it to normal uses. Prior to the war France was producing 
about 800,000 tons of sugar and consuming about 600,000 tons. She was 
able, therefore, to export practically one-fourth of her sugar produc- 
tion. Three-fourths of all the sugar beets in France were grown in 
the invaded territory. Since the war sugar beet production in the in- 
vaded areas has been reduced to practically nothing. The present 
production in France amounts to about 250,000 tons or possibly, with 
favored crop, it may run to 300,000 tons. In addition to this about 
eighty per cent of all the sugar factories have been utterly destroyed 
by the military invasion. The restoration and reconstruction, there- 
fore, of this area presents a most serious agricultural problem. 



10 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

BRITISH CONDITIONS. 

War is an upsetting experience, but when the unrestricted ''U-boat 
campaign" Avas announced England was more than upset. She 
was alarmed and at her wits' ends. No one could foresee what the 
result might be. The surrender of the British was expected by the 
enemy but could not be contemplated by the British themselves. Ac- 
cordingly, a determined effort was made to increase the home pro- 
duction of food stuffs as a measure of safety and self-preservation. 
War necessity was the only consideration. The methods pursued 
should not be regarded therefore as necessarily based on sound eco- 
nomic principles. If the practices erf a war emergency proved to be 
economically sound it was a mete accident, not the result of a deliberate 
choice. Necessity was the chief stimulus. 

A Food Production Department with a Director General was or- 
ganized. This carried into every county an Executive Committee with 
a complete and comprehensive organization clothed with authority to 
make the work effective. The chief divisions were: (1) Local organiza- 
tion; (2) Labor; (3) Cultivation; (4) Supplies; (5) Technical; 
(6) Horticulture. 

Within this organization the producing forces of England were 
mobilized in as effective a method as war conditions would permit. The 
reports for the harvest of 1918 indicate that in the matter of bread- 
stuffs England could supply herself forty weeks of the year as against 
ten weeks in 1916. Under the stimulus thus organized the acreage of 
tillable land for wheat, barley, oats, rye, and other cereals was con- 
siderably increased, almost 2,000,000 acres. In all, the acreage was 
increased over 1916 by 2,142,000 acres. Of this area 217,000 acres 
represented the increased area planted to potatoes. The increase in 
wheat area was the greatest since 1882. The increased acreage for 
oats was the highest on record. In England and Wales there was 
broken up not far from 2,500,000 acres of "permanent" grass land as 
a war measure. Including Ireland and Scotland the total area thus 
plowed up was approximately four million acres. 

The effect of this was twofold: (1) to increase food for home con- 
sumption; and (2) to decrease the demand for tonnage. Both of these 
effects were important factors in a war program. 

The labor problem for this increased acreage was not easy of solu- 
tion. Several factors entered into this. First, was an increase of the 
number of women who usually perform some of the agricultural labor 
and an increase of the amount of time these women gave to such labor. 
A second factor was the organization of the Women's Land Army. 

The estimates are that 260,000 women were employed in war agri- 
culture as against 90,000 prior to the war. The Women's Land Army 



REPORT OF W. O. THOMPSON^ CHAIRMAN. 11 

through the County Agricultural Committees provided for enrollment 
Dcd training centers to the number of six hundred and twelve. Two 
hundred Committees of selection aided in locating members of the 
Women's Land Army. The employment of these women in general was 
in the capacity of milkmaids, stockmen, tractor drivers, ploughmen, 
threshing gangs, horsemen and carters, and general farm laborers. The 
general effect of this movement upon the future of agriculture in Eng- 
land can not now be forecast but the significant thing about the move- 
ment would seem to be that Women's Institutes have been organized 
and a certain permanence assured. At all events the woman's point 
of view on agricultural production will receive more attention than in 
the past. 

A third factor in the labor problem w^as the plan for furloughing 
soldiers home for agricultural service. The record shows more than 
fifty-seven thousand soldiers were thus sent to the farms for longer or 
shorter periods. Many of these were accustomed to farm labor and 
made efficient farm laborers. The exigencies of the war situation, 
however, made this element in the solution of the labor problem less 
effective than was hoped. 

A fourth factor was the employment of German war prisoners. 
There were 189 camps organized in England for these prisoners in 
1917. Later this number was almost doubled. The records show that 
13,706 prisoners were assigned to farmers in 1917 and that plans 
were matured for using twice that number. At the outset some preju- 
dice against the use of prisoners existed, but this steadily disappeared. 
The testimony is that a majority of them proved to be steady and 
skilled laborers well content to go about their daily tasks. 

The general condition of British agriculture may be described as 
prosperous. Prices for labor and all materials are at a high level. 
So also is the range of prices for live stock of all kinds. The products 
of the garden were reasonable in price. Potatoes followed approxi- 
mately the supply and demand. In England transportation while below 
normal was not so much disturbed as in France. It was possible, 
therefore, to have a better distribution of products and more uni- 
formity in prices. 

The live stock conditions and general agricultural conditions are 
so amply treated in the reports of the members of the Commission 
that reference to these is made without further comment. 

The needs of England as indicated for the future are wheat, meats, 
concentrated feeds, sugar and fibers. This situation has suggested to 
the Commission the desirability of an aftei' toar program of produc- 
tion. These would seem to be the weightiest reasons for post helium 
cooperation. Unless the Allies can provide for some agency through 
which an international intelligence may guide the productive activi- 



12 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

ties of the several countries, an unbalanced production may break the 
markets and, through the resulting dissatisfaction- of the farmers, 
-dissipate much of the good feeling developed during the war. Further- 
more the intelligence developed through war experiences has put upon 
the nations a new moral responsibility in the matter of production. 
The world, by which we mean the many millions, has a right to ask 
that the organization of the world's forces shall be made effective in 
producing the necessary food supplies and in a proper distribution of 
them. If we can effectively and bountifully feed an army of unpre- 
cedented size, then there is some reason to believe that the world can 
if it will organize itself into an effective agency for feeding the world. 
This once determined upon, there will be abundant demand for all the 
products of the earth for years to come. 

FRENCH CONDITIONS. 

The first impression in passing through rural France suggests the 
lack of men of piilitary age and the wonderfully neat and clean con- 
dition of the farms in spite of this fact. Nowhere did we see in 
village or country men of military age unless in uniform. Probably 
nine millions of men (variously estimated at eight to ten millions) 
have been mobilized in some manner since the war. It has been 
affirmed by competent witnesses that for every man thus mobilized a 
woman has taken his place. These women carry on the business of 
the farm, meeting all engagements, performing the labor, paying the 
bills, and doing anything else necessary to keep the farms in action 
as ''going concerns." Without much noise or publicity the women of 
France have met the war situation with a devotion, an efficiency, and 
a heroism that should forever enshrine them in the affections of the 
French Nation. To their credit be it said that in 1917 when wheat 
prices did not change and when factory prices for woman's labor had 
advanced by leaps and bounds the peasant women remained with the 
farm and its work while their fellow women of the cities were receiv- 
ing the advantage of the rapid increase in wages. 

In the rural districts of France the labor of women was observed in 
almost every possible capacity — even to working on the maintenance 
and repair of the roads. The older men beyond military age were 
often engaged in work for which their age rendered them measurably 
inefficient. Despite these facts the appearance of the country and of 
the crops was good, although careful testimony revealed the fact that 
the labor shortage was felt in the reduced production. This year (1918) 
the beet sugar crop is probably the poorest in a generation and vege- 
tables in general are a poor crop. Potatoes are good in certain areas, 
but the lack of transportation facilities has hindered the distribu- 



REPORT OF W. O. THOMPSON_, CHAIRMAN. 13 

tion throughout France. The apple crop, good in 1917, is a failure in 
1918. The supply of dairy products is very limited in the cities. The 
loss of two million cattle since the war, including many producing 
cows, has reduced the total supply of milk. At present despite their 
shortage in totals there are as many or more yearling cattle as in 
1914 and the younger milch cows are being retained. Since 1917 a 
glass of milk could not be purchased anywhere in the cities due to 
lack of transportation, the demands of the army and the country con- 
sumption. At present (October, 1918) milk may not be sold after 
9 A. M. None may be sold in restaurants and hotels except a limited 
amount for breakfast. Milk cards are issued as a protection for chil- 
dren and the sick. 

In general French agriculture in the areas not invaded during the 
war period has been influenced by the shortage of men for labor and 
the substitution therefor of Avoman labor and of children below the 
normal age for agricultural work. This has affected in some measure 
the efficiency of farm operation, thus tending to decrease the annual 
output. The shortage of fertilizers and the withdrawal of horses for 
army purposes have contributed to the same end. The invaded areas 
have been practically depopulated through the destruction of the 
villages. The lin>ited agricultural activities in these regions have not 
greatly increased the total supply for the country since most of the 
production was by the military organizations and often lacked the 
continuity in cultivation and careful attention so essential to success- 
ful crop growing. The immediate restoration of this invaded area to 
normal production is obviously impossible. The second year after the 
war should show great progress toward the normal conditions pro- 
vided the processes of restoring the land are promptly set in motion^ 
I'his calls for the reconstruction of the villages, a supply of farm 
machinery, the necessary factories in sugar beet growing areas and 
the general reclamation of shell-torn areas for farm operations. This 
preliminary preparation for agricultural operations, if left to private 
initiative, may be long delayed. It would seem to be a most urgent 
public enterprise in which the allied governments should cooperate 
as the final stage of the war activities. To leave such an undertaking 
to the governments of France and Belgium will put upon them an 
economic handicap for which no money indemnity could adequately 
compensate. 

The outstanding shortages in France may be mentioned in the 
following order, although there is room for a difference of opinion as 
to the exact order basing opinion upon comparative necessity. These 
needs are: wheat, meat, concentrated feeds, sugar, fertilizers, farm 
machinery and dairy products. The fact that France in 1918 had 
substantially as many yearling cattle as in 1914 will make it possible 



14 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

to return to the pre-war production within two or three years pro- 
vided she is able to import a sufficient supply of meat meantime. 
The close of the war should make possible in a short time such a 
reorganization of shipping facilities as would promptly readjust the 
market for fertilizers and concentrated feeds. This would at once 
react favorably upon all other agricultural needs. 

The opinion of the Commission may be expressed as favoring such 
continued cooperation among the allied governments as will provide 
for urgent needs arising out of war conditions. This cooperation should 
not be left to private initiative but should be with such official recog- 
nition as to insure an adequate program free from the evils of ex- 
ploitation. The effect of the war upon agricultural production in 
France will abide for a period of two or three years at least. It would 
appear, therefore, that cooperation in recovery is an important oppor- 
tunity not to be neglected if the best fruits of the war are to be 
preserved. 

OTHER COUNTRIES. 

In the time at its disposal the Commission was not able to visit 
Scotland, Ireland and Italy, as was anticipated. 

Mr. Eommel, however, was able to make a brief journey into Scot- 
land. His report deals with conditions there so far as the limited 
time available permitted him to make observations. 

Mr. Pearson spent a few days in Italy and has submitted a report 
on his observations. Eeference to this report, which is presented 
as a part of the Commission's report, will disclose an interesting 
situation in Italy. The story of the effect of the war upon agricultural 
operations and conditions is much the same in all the invaded areas. 
Where countries have been invaded the destruction and often the 
obliteration of farm buildings, machinery, live stock and villages make 
the problems of agriculture primarily those of reconstruction, refur- 
nishing and rehabilitation. 

CONCLUSION. 

In submitting this report it is proper to state that the Chairman of 
The Committee is responsible for the general summary. The members 
of the Commission are responsible for the individual reports presented 
herewith as part of the report of the Commission. The suggestions 
and recommendations presented were discussed at length, and agreed 
to by the Commission. These are presented separately in order that 
they may stand out as the opinion and judgment of the Commission 
and not be confused with the individual opinions or judgments of mem- 
bers of the Commission as expressed in their reports. No effort was 



REPORT OF W. O. THOMPSON^ CHAIRMAN. 15 

made to harmonize in detail either the expression of opinions or 
judgments by members of the Commission. Statements of fact based 
upon statistical evidence, official reports or personal testimony may 
not always agree in detail owing to the time at which the informa- 
tion was secured. These minor details, however, do not influence the 
general conclusions to be dr^wn concerning British and French agri- 
culture as set out in these reports. The theory upon which the Com- 
mission proceeded gave full freedom to each member to present the 
results of his observations and investigations in a personal report. 
Frequent conferences and discussions determined the general character 
of the work of the Commission as well as of the reports submitted. 

On behalf of the Commission, the Chairman is privileged to express 
the appreciation of all the members of the honor conferred upon them 
and the confidence reposed in them by the appointment to this service. 
So far as is known this is the first and only war commission charged 
with the single duty of investigating the conditions of agricultural 
production. The aim was, if possible, to discover what could be done 
to make it absolutely safe that so far as food supplies were involved 
the war would be won. Further, the outlook for agriculture after the 
war was a subject of thought and discussion. The Commission submits 
its report in the hope that the way has been opened for further 
cooperation with our transatlantic neighbors in the future. 

With renewed expression of thanks and appreciation of the Com- 
mission, this report of its service is respectfully submitted. 

Very truly, 

W. O. Thompson, 

Chairman. 
Hon. David F. Houston, 

Secretary of Agriculture. 



16 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



REPORT OF R. A. PEARSON. 



THE CONDITION OF AGRICULTURE IN GREAT BRITAIN, 
FRANCE, AND ITALY, AND PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION 
AFTER THE WAR, AND THEIR EFFECT ON AMERICAN 
AGRICULTURE. 

Like all other interests in the countries of the Allies, agricnlture has 
had to make its heavy contribution to the war. This has been chiefly 
in men, but also in larger taxes, in sacrifice of many horses and food 
animals, in higher costs for labor and supplies, and in countless more 
01' less serious inconveniences due to army needs, interrupted trans- 
portation, lack of fertilizer, and sometimes losses on account of fixed 
prices and regulations regarding the sale of products. In devastated 
districts the sacrifice has been to the utmost except the lives of those 
who could escape and the small amount of personal property they could 
take away and except the land itself, which is now in a more or less 
serious condition depending upon how much it has been subjected to 
shell fire and bombs and to Vv^hat extent it was made readj^ for military- 
operations by trenches and barbed wire. 

Each G-overnment has furnished relief and help to agriculture 
through the guarantee of stimulative prices on certain products, 
through loans, direct assistance with tractors and plows at less than 
cost, and through labor from military sources. In the devastated 
regions of Northern France money is being given to the returned 
farmers to help them rebuild, restock, and to renew their farm 
operations. 

In each of the allied countries the subjects of rehabilitation and 
readjustment in the field of agriculture are receiving attention. But 
definite, comprehensive plans are not yet announced. It is natural 
that each nation would desire to make its own plans, and it is obvious 
that they are the best qualified to do so, as our nation would assert for 
itself if conditions should obtain here as there. It is generally agreed 
that several years will pass, after peace is assured, until normal condi- 
tions are restored. Some authorities thinlj; this will require from five 
to seven years ; one mentions the possibility of ten years. 

In Great Britain the production of wheat has been greatly increased, 
and at the sacrifice of many fine pastures. The fertilizer situation is 
serious, but not nearly so bad as it would have been without the 
fertilizer by-products from manufacturing and munition making. 
Aside from the labor shortage, the greatest difficulty now encountered 
by farmers in Great Britain is the shortage of concentrated feeding 
stuffs, which is expected to materially cut down the home-grown meat 



REPORT OF R. A. PEARSON. 17 

Supply next spring. But in spite of this the best breeding stock of all 
kinds is being kept up in good condition and the supply of market 
milk is being maintained nearly to the quantity needed. There is a 
decrease in meat production, especially in pork. English farmers 
expect to sell stock in war-devastated areas as soon as conditions 
permit. The need of more good cheese in English markets was empha- 
sized. Wheat and meat, of course, will continue to be needed in large 
amounts. 

Generallj^ speaking, the farmers of the United Kingdom have done 
well both as to speeding up production and as to profits. There is an 
active movement in the sale of land to tenant farmers and at good 
prices. 

In Great Britain an extended report on Agricultural Policies, with 
recommendations, has been issued from a subcommittee of the Ministry 
of Reconstruction. Many agricultural leaders and experts gave evi- 
dence in 1916 and 1917. A summary of this has been published. Then 
there followed the committee's report, published this year. The com- 
mittee was instructed to report especially upon methods to secure an 
increase of home-grown food supplies. They carefully reviewed the 
agricultural situation, including a study of pre-war conditions. The 
recommendations cover a wide range of subjects related to agriculture. 
But future policies are not yet decided. One of the big questions very 
often referred to is whether the Government will take steps to con- 
tinue some form of encouragement to wlieat growing to make this crop 
reasonably remunerative so that larger yields can and will be main- 
tained as a national protective measure. Other food crops and farm 
animals are included more or less in these discussions. With the 
services of horses in this war in mind one easily sees the importance 
of measures to improve horse breeding. As a war measure a minimum 
wage has been established for farm laborers, and their hours of work 
are regulated. Some think it is very doubtful as to whether these 
measures will be given up after the war. If they are continued, they, 
of course, would be used as an argument in favor of governmental 
action to furnish some protection to farmers against loss in food 
production. Making it possible for returned soldiers to secure small 
farms and homes on easy terms, and better homes for farm laborers 
are questions upon which considerable pi-ogress already has been made. 
Small farms already are awaiting purchase by discharged soldiers, 
who are receiving practical agricultural training, and small homes are 
being erected. 

France has suffered severely in her agriculture. Her great wheat 
yield has been heavily reduced. There has been a reduction in the num- 
ber of cattle, but the number of calves shows an increase over pre-war 
figures. The land needs fertilizer and the live stock is in need of 



18 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

concentrates. Beet-sugar production has been an important industry 
in Northern France, and it suffered the fate of all other industries in 
the devastated area. France now needs to continue for an indefinite 
time her imports of wheat and meat. She also needs fertilizers and, 
especially for the devastated area, she needs a large quantity of farm 
machiner}^, building material, and stock. 

Many farmers in the main portion of France, which did not suffer 
from invasion, have prospered under war conditions. Many others 
have not. All farmers seem to have done their best to keep up the 
production. In the devastated area, which comprises a strip of land 
where the fighting has been most active, destruction is complete. It 
is hard to imagine how it could be worse. The farmers' villages are 
in ruins. Frequently not one structure remains intact. In some cases 
hardly a wall remains in sight. The land is cut by trenches with 
numerous dugouts. There are many barbed-wire entanglements. Also 
there are very many shell holes from three to about twenty feet in 
diameter, with occasionally a larger one. The people all were driven 
out. They could take but little of their property. All that was left 
behind was carried off or destroyed. But only a small percentage of 
France has been injured so seriously. 

In Italy the greatest agricultural need at this time is fertilizers, 
especially phosphates. The lack of imports during these few years has 
had a cumulative effect which is becoming serious. The situation is 
further aggravated by the fields becoming foul with weeds, due to 
shortage of labor. These conditions will seriously affect production 
for at least a year or two and probably considerably longer. The 
invasion of a large area in Northern Italy resulted in the almost com- 
plete disappearance of the fine cattle of that section. The number 
of cattle in the country has been greatly reduced also by the increased 
meat requirements, which led to the slaughter of many animals. The 
maintenance of large imports of frozen meat is wanted, so that young 
live stock may be spared to be matured, and normal conditions as to 
animals for work, meat, and milk may be restored as soon as possible. 
The shortage of agricultural machinery also is serious on account of 
reduced imports. 

What can the United States or farmers in this country do to help? 

Our first and immediate opportunity lies in food production. Sec- 
ondly, we will be asked for seeds, farm machinery, stock feeds, ferti- 
lizers, cotton, wool, and other supplies that farmers need. It is not 
to be expected that we will be asked to send to Europe large numbers 
of breeding animals, because our breeds are not known and favored to 
any great extent in the districts needing restocking. But doubtless 
our breeders will feel the effects of stock movements into the empty 



REPORT OF R. A, PEARSON. 19 

areas. Some animals, including poultry, will be wanted there, or in 
other places from which shipments are made. 

The question now of utmost importance to us relates to the quanti- 
ties of food from this country that will be wanted in Europe during 
the next few years. Large demands will be made on us for a time, but 
no one can tell how much will be wanted, even for the next year. It 
will depend upon : 

(1) What the different countries can do for themselves. 

(2) What amounts will be available in other exporting countries. 

(3) What shipping facilities will be available. 

These important factors in turn depend upon others which are in 
doubt and include the military situation, the restoration of normal 
agricultural processes, the weather as it affects crops, and ship 
building. 

Wheat production in Russia is an item of great importance and 
doubt. In the average of the years 1911 to 1913 the Russian Empire 
wheat crop exceeded the crop in any other country, being 727,133,300 
bushels, with the United States second, at 704,995,000 bushels. Fur- 
thermore, the Russian Empire produced 935,010,300 bushels of rye, the 
next largest production of rye being in Germany, with less than half 
as much. No one knows what Russia will do in food production, but 
all know that what she has been producing is an item of enormous 
importance. It is a serious question, also, as to hovv^ rapidly France, 
Italj', and Austria-Hungary can resume normal or near-normal 
production. 

The meat and fats situation also is abnormal, and this kind of pro- 
duction requires considerable time for readjustment even when all 
conditions are favorable. 

American farmers have speeded up their efforts in order to have a 
surplus for export to the Allies during the war. Reasonably accurate 
information as to what quantities of foods were wanted for export 
these last two years has been available, and our farmers have been 
advised by the United States Department of Agriculture and the State 
Colleges as to how much they should increase production. They should 
not now be left to make their own estimates as to the future. If they 
have needed advice the last two years they will need it still more the 
next two years. 

This leads to the recommendation that foreign governments be in- 
vited to inform our Government as to the principal food supplies they 
will wish to find here. The information should come sufficiently early 
to be of use in making food production plans. Furthermore, it should 
be accompanied by a satisfactory guarantee, from each Government 
concerned, as to price. With such information and such a guarantee 
the question of taking steps to produce a surplus becomes a plain busi- 



20 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

ness proposition. This arrangement would place the risk on the people 
to be benefited. If it is left with the producers, they are likely to act 
on the safe side and gradually or rapidly return to the usual acreages 
and numbers of stock. 

Great advantages to this and other nations should come from inter- 
national discussions of food-production plans during a period of a 
few years after the war. A special body might well be constituted 
for this purpose, and it should have the benefit of assistance of the 
International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. 

It is recommended, also, that some representatives of our Govern- 
ment, who are "familiar with our agricultural conditions, shall be desig- 
nated to participate in international councils, giving special attention 
to the rehabilitation of farms and to other agricultural questions. 
Such persons also, for a time, should be available in Europe for con- 
sultation with representatives of other Governments who will need to 
look to this country for help, in the form of seeds and other supplies. 
The need of agricultural information from the United States frequently 
is urgent. Very large interests are concerned. And the settlement of 
questions should not depend upon persons who are not informed, nor 
upon those who happen to be abroad to represent private interests, 
although some gentlemen in this latter class undoubtedly have rendered 
valuable service. 

THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN ITALY, AS AFFECTED BY 

THE WAR. 

The following information was secured chiefly from officials of the 
Italian Department of Agriculture in Rome, October 5-7, 1918. 

IN GENERAL. 

Agricultural operations in Italy have been carried forward against 
very great difficulties. Relief is being furnished through the impor- 
tation of wheat and frozen meat and through the use of prisoners of 
war and other prisoners. Government officials placed great emphasis 
upon the need of fertilizers, especially phosphates. They also empha- 
sized the desirability of continuing the importation of frozen meat 
and even on an increased scale, so that the largest possible number 
of young live stock may be retained and matured for breeding pur- 
poses and as dairy and work animals. At the present time Italy is 
said to be short about one million cows and half a nftllion oxen. 

It is not necessary here to dwell upon the changed conditions in 
Italy outside of agriculture, but we should not overlook the fact that 
some of these conditions are very serious and that they have an 
important influence upon agricultural operations. For example, owing 



REPORT OF R. A. PEARSON. 



21 



to the shortage of coal, various industries have suffered, but particu- 
larly transportation has been afifected. At times there has been coal 
only for the main railroad lines. This has interfered with the ship- 
ment of the food supplies. Also, it has interfered with the shipment 
of articles needed by farmers. Owing to transportation difficulties, 
due to coal shortage and other causes, it is said that considerable 
perishable produce has spoiled during shipment. 

It is said that in sections where mixed farming prevails — that is, 
where perhaps milk, fruit, grain, and vegetables are produced — the 
farmers are doing well from the standpoint of profits — even better 
than before the war. But in the more exclusive grain districts the 
farmers are not so pix)sperous. One of the great sacrifices made by 
farmers was the plowing up of permanent, irrigated pastures for the 
purpose of utilizing this ground with its nitrogen reserves for growing 
grain. It means much to destroy one of these old pastures, the surface 
of which has been so carefully formed to care for irrigation waters. 
Generally, the farmers broke up this land willingly when requested 
or directed to do so. Sometimes they protested, but as a rule they were 
satisfied to sacrifice their grass lands when the need for this was 
explained to them. 

CROPS. 



During the last few years there has been some reduction of culti- 
vated area, especially in Southern Italy, where the agricultural popu- 
lation lives chierty in towns. But except for wheat the reduction has 
not been very serious. The area in wheat was about normal up to and 
including the 1916 harvest, when 4,726,300 hectares were reported. 
Since then there has been a decrease of about 500,000 hectares. The 
yield per acre also has decreased, the tvvo* chief direct causes being 
shortage of fertilizer and uncontrolled growth of weeds. The latter, 
of course, means a shortage of labor. Women and boys used to give 
a great deal of help in controlling weeds, but now they must do more, 
important and heavier work elsewhere. Owing to unusually good 
climatic conditions, the yield of wheat in 191 8 is favorable, especially 
as compared with the preceding year. 

Wheat Producti07i. 



Year. 


Quintals 
(220 lbs.). 


Quintals 

per 
hectare. 


Year. 


Quintals 
(220 IbB.). 


Quintals 

per 
hectare. 


1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 


61,813,000 
41,750,000 
52,362,000 
45,102,000 
58,452.000 j 


10.9 
8.8 

11.0 
9.5 

12.3 


1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 


46,153,000 
46,414,000 
48,044,000 
38.102,000 
1 43,000,000 


9.7 
9.2 

10.2 
S.9 



1 Estimated. 



22 



REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



In normal times Italy imports 12 to 15 million quintals annually. 
Last year the importations amounted to about 32 millions of quintals. 
This year the quantity of wheat needed through imports probably will 
amount to as much as 25 million quintals. 

The Italians depend greatly on their bread supply. A simple calcu- 
lation on the basis of 38 million inhabitants shows a liberal quantity 
of wheat per capita. At times during the war, some districts have 
suffered for wheat. Early in 1916 at one time the supply of flour in 
Rome was reduced to a quantity sufficient only for about three days. 
In some small towns in 1917 no flour was available for a period as long 
as ten days. In one industrial center where there was no bread for 
one day there were riots. By waj' of emphasizing the serious cumu- 
lative effect of lack of fertilizer, it was stated that if this situation 
continues the wheat yield by 1920 or 1921 may be reduced to 50 per 
cent of the normal yield. Elsewhere it is mentioned that some diffi- 
culty has been found in getting farmers to plant wheat, because 
already their yield per hectare has fallen so low as to make the crop 
unpromising. To stimulate wheat growing the Government takes the 
crop and now pays 60 lire (franc) per quintal, with an addition of 15 
per cent, making a total of about 69 lire for hard wheat produced in 
southern Italy. Next year the Government will raise the rate fi-om 
60 to 75 lire in its effort to have the acreage maintained. This higher 
rate is equivalent to |4.09 per bushel, assuming rate of exchange to be 
normal. 

The Government incurs a heavy loss in the sale of wheat in order to 
hold down the price of bread. It is sold to local committees for bakers 
for 46 lire per quintal. 

The maximum prices of cereals as announced by the Government 
represent what the farmer-receives. The Government pays for cartage 
from the farm. The maximum prices announced in Ministry decrees 
for the crops of 1917, 1918, and 1919 are as follows, in lire per quintal: 



Maximum Prices Announced in Ministry Decrees. 



Cereal. 



Soft and semi-hard wheats 

Hard wheats 

Corn 

Oats 

Barley 

Rye 



1917 



1918 



For Italy. 



Additional for 

southern Italy 

and certain 

islands. 



7.50 
9.00 
5.50 
5.50 
6.00 
6.00 



For Italy. 



Additional for 

southern Italy 

and certain 

islands. 



11.25 
12.75 
8.40 
8.40 
9.30 
9.30 



REPORT OF R. A. PEARSON. 



23 



The par value of one lire, according to the United States Director of 
the Mint, is 19.3 cents ; the exchange value of one lire on July 1, 1918, 
was 11.2 cents and on October 1, 1918, 15.75 cents. 

Through the Ministry of Supplies the Government buys all wheat, 
corn, barley, and rye. Through the Ministry of AVar it buys all of the 
oats and certain beans which are eaten by the people. Through the 
Ministry of Agriculture the Government buys seed potatoes. The 
entire potato crop is not taken because of its perishable nature. An 
official effort was made to limit the jjrice of potatoes, but this was not 
a success, because the farmers considered the price too low and they 
were unwilling to sell, and some of them even did not dig their crop. 
The interference with potato prices there was discontinued, excei)t that 
the Government intervenes if prices become too high at any point. 

The changes of prices of the principal crops is shown in the following 
table : 

Average Annual Prices. 



Products. 




In lire (about 20 cents) per quintal (220 lbs.). 




1912 


1913 


1914 


1915 


1916 


Soft wheat 


30.71 
34.11 
21.92 
38.01 

25.43 

10.63 

"■'8.95 
36.23 
148.20 


28.68 
32.48 
18.16 
41.28 

22.48 

10.64 

" " 8.46 
30.08 
146.90 


28.75 
33.50 
18.10 
36.56 
21.67 
21.10 
21.92 
24.53 
31.17 
10.21 
96.04 
9.48 
23.12 
151.61 


40.43 
44.67 
29.47 
39.50 
33.63 
26.84 
30.07 
29.24 
41.54 
13.84 

127.25 

9.38 

35.56 

167.50 


38.49 




42.69 




28.80 


Rice 


42.53 


Rye 


35.31 




28.55 


Oats 


30.35 




30.97 




53.03 




14.96 




206.13 


Hay 


12.20 




78.11 




204.28 







Active efforts are being made to encourage the production of malt- 
ing barley, and the Government is giving particular attention to the 
selection of varieties of rice as well as wheat and other crops which 
are best adapted to different sections of the country. 

Thanks to the ability of the Italian farmers to cooperate, as has been 
shown through their successful cooperative agricultural organizations, 
excellent work is being done along the lines of seed improvement and 
with active Government help. In each province there is a special com- 
missioner of seeds. He has power to seize and distribute any seed 
needed. This power is given to assure the distribution of seeds into 
sections where they will give the best returns and at fair prices. The 
work is done as far as possible through private seed concerns. Their 
business is regulated, but it is not taken away from them as long as 
they are considered to be dealing fairly. It is said that private trade 
is respected and efforts are made to encourage it. If the Government 



2A 



REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



regulations are not complied with, the business is taken over by 
officials. Wheat seed may not be sold until it is declared fit by the 
commissioner. This is a war measure and is looked upon as highly 
important. Before seed can be sold it must be properly cleaned and 
graded. If seedsmen do not have necessary machines for this, the 
Government gives help to secure the machinery'. The authorities have 
requisitioned some of the best seed-growing areas in their plans to 
assure sufficient seed of good quality. Also, the Government arranges 
to take superior seed from farmers who might use it otherwise and 
gives them in exchange grain of smaller seed value but of equal value 
for other purposes. A bonus of a few lire per quintal, perhaps as high 
as 5 lire, also is allowed, and even a still larger bonus for seed of good 
qualitj^ or high value. The net result of all these efforts is said to be 
that the farmers are now getting better seed than they got before 
the war. 

LIVE STOCK. 



Information on this subject was furnished at the Ministry of Agri- 
culture, chiefly by Dr. Vittorino Vezzani, Director of the Zootechnic 
Institute of Monte di Mezzo. 

There was no census of cattle in Italy before the war, but according 
to a close estimate the number of cattle and calves in 1908 was 
about 0,200,000. It is believed that this number had increased by at 
least 15 per cent in 1914. A census taken this year showed about 
6,150,000 bovine animals, or about the same number as in 1908. These 
figures indicate comparatively little change since 1908, but the fact 
is there has been a large change as the normal relation between young 
stock and old stock has been altered. There is now a relatively large 
amount of young stock, with a heavy decrease in numbers of cows and 

oxen. Thus : 

Cattle in Italy, 191!, and WIS. 



Kind. 


1914 (estimated). 


1918 census. 




1,600,000 

140,000 

3,900.000 

1,460,000 


1,801,808 




171,544 




3,058,194 




1,128.873 






"Total 


7,100,000 


6,155,419 







Many orders have been in effect for the purpose of conserving live 
stock. For example, in some sections cals^es weighing Jess than 440 
pounds could not be slaughtered. In other sections the minimum limit 
was 120 pounds ; and there were rules against the slaughter of heifers 
or pregnant cows. The number of sheep that could be slaughtered and 
their age were regulated. No lamb weighing less than 17.2 pounds 



REPORT OF R. A. PEARSON. 25 

could be killed. Pigs weighing less than about 150 pounds could not 
be killed. It was unlawful to slaughter mares or asses that might be 
used for breeding purposes. Farmers protested against some of these 
rulings, and revisions were made in an effort to have them more 
acceptable. 

Ital}^ now is said to need 1,000,000 cows and 500,000 oxen. Prac- 
tical difficulties in the way of supplying this stock even after the war 
include transportation, but more particularly the fact that just the 
kind of live stock wanted is not freely available. It is pointed out that 
with only a little more than 0,000,000 cattle, including young stock, 
to about 38,000,000 people, the reduction in number of animals is a 
serious matter for Italy. 

The reduction in number of live stock is due to the loss of large num- 
bers of animals to the enemy in invaded sections and to the necessity 
of slaughtering stock to furnish meat needed by the soldiers and 
civilian war workers. In the provinces lost temporarily in the war 
there were about 400,000 cattle, and these were taken by the enemy. 
This was especially serious because it almost cleaned out an important 
strain of cattle in Ital3\ They were derived from Swiss stock, appar- 
ently the Simmenthal, and were considered superior because they grow 
faster and have lighter skeletons and therefore less waste than the 
usual Italian cattle, which have been developed largely with the view 
to their working qualities. Fortunately, it has been the custom 
annually to send some thousand head of young stock from northern 
Italy to Tuscany to be fattened for the city markets. These were saved 
from the invasion and now are being held under direction of the Gov- 
ernment for breeding purposes. The Austrians also helped themselves 
to a ver}^ large quantity of preserved meat in tins, which had* to be 
replaced by the slaughter of more animals. The rate of slaughter 
also was increased because of the greater requirements of meat for 
the Army. Soldiers needed more meat than the same men required 
when outside of the Army. The speeding up of industries also in- 
creased the demand for meat, and many Italian people who had pre- 
viously used but little meat came into the market for it. The diffi- 
culties were further increased by the shortage of shipping accommoda- 
tions and the impossibility of getting as ranch frozen beef as was 
wanted. Much of this came from Argentina. The importation of 
frozen meat by the Ministry of War amounted to 291,79-1 quintals in 
1915. The amount increased to 909,894 quintals in 1916 and to 
1,006,995 quintals in 1917. The total of these importations for three 
years was equivalent to more than 1 ,000,000 cattle of an average weight 
of about 900 pounds. The number of animals slaughtered in Italy 
during the three years of war was about 7,000,000 instead of sliglitly 
over 5,000,000, which would have been normal. 



26 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

With the war the supply of concentrated feeding stuffs fell off. A 
larger per cent of wheat was made into flour, which reduced the 
quantity of bran. Little oil seed was available in Italy, and importa- 
tions of seed and cake were interrupted. The oil seed was so scarce 
that prices of oil became exceedingly high. There was such a serious 
shortage of hay in some districts, largely due to requisitioning the 
supply for the Army, that farmers had to gather leaves and branches 
to feed their cattle. It is said that some farmers had to depend upon 
the leaves of elms, mulberries, poplars, and vines ; also upon the residue 
from making wines. In Sicily the cactus was used. 

The meat supplies for the civil population had to be reduced about 
50 per cent in 11)17, and recently the reduced supplies have been cut 
in two, so that now the meat supplies for civilians are about one- 
quarter normal. Rationing with meat tickets has not been resorted to 
because there is such a wide difference as to the use of meat. Some 
persons use none and tickets issued to them would easily become 
objects of sale and the purpose of rationing would be defeated. The 
average amount of meat available per person in Rome is only about 
200 grams per month. A limited amount of meat is allowed to the 
butcher shops, and long lines of people await their turn whenever there 
is prospect of making purchase. The meat is allowed only on three 
days of each week — Thursday, Saturday, and Sunday. 

Normally, the price of animals on the hoof varies from 80 to 100 
lire per quintal (220 pounds). The Government requisition price in 
October, 1918, was 800 lire for calves and 330 lire for grown animals. 
When animals are sold privately for working or milking purposes the 
prices may run up to 1,000 lire per quintal for grown animals and the 
prices of calves up to 700 lire per quintal. The normal butcher-shop 
prices for meat with 25 per cent bone is 3 to 3V2 liJ^e per kilogram 
(2.2 pounds). The price in October was 8 lire. The meat business is 
controlled by the Government. 

A three-year program has been worked out in connection with the 
meat situation. It is proposed to continue the present curtailment in 
the use of meat for three years after the war. It is desired, also, to 
•increase the importation of frozen meats from 20,000 tons each month, 
which they do not now always succeed in getting, to 28,000 tons for 
the Army. It is hoped that importations can be continued in such 
quantity and for such length of time as may be necessary after the 
war to save desirable young stock for breeding. 

Among special measures taken to prevent speculation, prefects of 
provinces were authorized to forbid the movement of work animals 
from their provinces. The enforcement of such a regulation naturally 
would be difficult, and it is not known how efficient attention was given 
to this work. 



REPORT OF R. A. PEARSON. 27 

The Italian Government takes great interest in stock breeding. The 
Ministry of War cooperates in and encourages the breeding of horses 
and mules. There are stud farms. The Ministry of Agriculture gives 
similar attention to other breeds of animals. The Ministry of the 
Interior has charge of veterinary work. 

Poultry is very expensive. It is scarce because grains can not be 
used as feed. In many cities it used to be forbidden to keep poultry, 
but now the people are encouraged to utilize their kitchen waste in 
this way. 

Rabbits constitute an important food item. They have been greatly 
decreased on account of the reduction of clover and alfalfa, which have 
been turned over to the Army, but near the cities there has been some 
increase of rabbits with the use of food discarded from the markets. 

DAIRYING. 

Much of the best dairy work in Italy was carried on in the northern 
districts, which were invaded. Besides the loss of dairy herds, a large 
number of well-equipped dairy factories were wrecked. There is, oi 
course, a shortage of market milk, acute at times. Milk prices have 
been changed frequently, the effort being made to keep them high 
enough to serve as a suitable stimulus to production. Before the war 
in Northern Italy farmers received 15 centimes per liter for milk, and 
in cities it was sold for 30 centimes. In Southern Italy the prices were 
about 25 and 35 centimes, respectively. In October, 1918, in Northern 
and Central Italy consumers were buying milk for 80 centimes per 
liter, in Rome at 90 centimes, and in Northern Italj^ at 1 lire per liter. 
The sale of milk is usually organized and conducted by communes, 
although considerable quantities are handled by private dealers. 

Only a little butter is being produced. Considerable cheese is made, 
but it is all requisitioned for the Army. In some districts the cheese 
output is as high as 70 per cent of the normal. 

It is thought that some arrangement will be made for the Govern- 
ment to assist farmers in Northern Italy to buy dairy cows and thus 
restore their herds as promptly as possible after they can return to 
their land. If the use of tractors continues after the war, there will be 
less demand for work cattle and more demand for animals that will 
economically produce meat and milk. As to whether strictly dairy 
breeds would be wanted in Italy, there is considerable doubt. A few 
years ago representatives of one of the best dairy breeds were tried, 
but they were not popular. It was said they were hard to acclimatize 
and they would not fatten up well. Besides this, of course, they had 
the objection of not being good work animals for those who clung to 
the old ideas. It was pointed out that probably the United States 



28 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

could not help Italy much by sending dairy cattle, but they could give 
great help by furnishing frozen meat, which would assist Italy to 
mature her own young stock. Canned meat has not been popular, 
but might be substituted to a certain extent. 

SHEEP. 

Sheep have increased in number slightly since 1908. There are now 
about 11,000,000 head, or the same as in 1914. One explanation for 
this is the reduction of land devoted to grain, thus furnishing more 
uncultivated area where sheep may be pastured. Also, there is a heavy 
demand for wool, and but little is imported. Besides this, cheese made 
from sheep's milk is an important food. 

HOGS. 

The number of hogs has greatly decreased. They have been fed 
according to three different systems : First, on small farms, where they 
were given the refuse and but little grain ; such feeding continues, but 
there are few animals. Second, some swine have been fed on corn; 
this has had to be stopped because all of the corn was needed for 
human food. Third, considerable numbers of hogs were fed on whey; 
there are less of these now, because less cheese is being made. 

HORSES. 

There is a reduction in the number of horses, due to the heavy Army 
demands. Many have been imported from America. The shortage will 
be relieved very quickly and in large measure as soon as demobilization 
begins. 

MEASURES TO INCREASE PRODUCTION. 

When it first became evident that measures would need to be taken 
to stimulate food production in Italy, an extensive campaign was 
started by the Government, and this has been actively continu:ed to 
the present time. Also, plans have been made which will extend two 
or three years in the future. The Government efforts related chiefly 
to wheat, corn, potatoes, oats, barley, rye, beans, vegetables, and live 
stock ; in some regions also sugar beets. The work is carried on under 
the authority of the Minister of Agriculture, Senor Giambattista 
Miliani, and under the immediate direction of Professor Antonio 
Marozzi, Director of the Office of Rural Organization. The Depart- 
ment of Agriculture devotes itself to questions of production . A sepa- 
rate Ministry of Foods gives special attention to distribution and 
prices. 



REPORT OF R. A. PEARSON. 29 

The Department of Agriculture was made responsible for the main- 
tenance of production of food and was given power by law, if necessary, 
to compel farmers to increase their acreage of certain crops. As a 
rule, the farmers gave fine cooperation. Each province and subdivision 
of province was carefully studied as to its normal area and production, 
the rotations in operation and the possibilities of increases. Orders 
for increasing production applied to areas or zones having fairly uni- 
form agricultural conditions. These orders gave the percentage of 
the area of each farm that must be devoted to certain specific crops. 
For example, in one of the lower Venetian provinces the division of 
land might have been required as follows : In wheat, 55 per cent ; in 
maize, potatoes, or beets, 15 per cent; in hemp or other "industrial 
products," 10 per cent; in pasture, 20 per cent. 

In another section having much live stock, more land would be 
allowed for pasture, and perhaps only 40 per cent would be required to 
grow wheat. In computing the percentage of area to be devoted to 
different crops, certain areas were excluded, such as vegetable gar- 
dens, orchards, vineyards, tracts of mulberry trees for silk worms, 
woods, stone-paved yards, court yards, and roads. 

The law provided a fine of about $50 per acre for any person who 
failed to apportion and cultivate his land as directed. Also, the 
Government could seize such land, including machinery, animals, and 
seeds, and turn this entire equipment over to others designated by the 
Government and who would follow instructions. Occasionally a farm 
Avas taken in this manner. This occurred in numerous cases in the 
vicinity of Rome, where the high prices of wool, cheese, and milk were 
a temptation to the farmers to keep the land in grass in spite of orders 
to the contrary. When the Government took a parcel of land it paid 
a minimum rental. In these matters the Government is assisted in 
each province by an agricultural committee or section having an 
agricultural officer known as a commissioner. These commissioners 
receive salary from the Government. In each of the smaller divisions 
of the province, known as communes, there are voluntry cooperating 
commissioners. The agricultural committee is made up of two or 
three farm operators, the same number of farm workmen, one military 
man, and an agricultural expert. Usually this last is the director of 
the traveling schools of agriculture in the province. The law requires 
the agricultural institutional representatives and their staffs and 
agricultural associations to cooperate. Each committee is in close 
touch with the situation in its district, and is assisted by some Gov- 
ernment traveling representatives and other traveling men, who report 
conditions as they are observed in difflerent places. It was emphasized 
that the agricultural commissioners are either expert agricultural 
advisers or successful farm operators, and never politicians. 



30 



REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



At the headquarters office in Rome the work is divided under four 
chief heads, as follows: (1) Technical, (2) Legal, (3) Labor, (4) 
Mechanical Plowing. The Labor Office gives special attention to the 
distribution of emergency farm labor. Italian soldiers are made 
available for short periods. Prisoners of war are utilized. The office 
has power, also, to compel civilians to work on farms, but this power 
has not been exercised. The Mechanical Plowing section gives atten- 
tion chiefly to the introduction and use of tractors for plowing. The 
machines are owned by the Government and are operated by soldiers. 
There are about one thousand power machines now in use by the Gov- 
ernment, in addition to about one thousand which are owned privately. 
Two thousand more outfits are being built, and orders have been placed 
for two or three thousand in addition. Only a few of these machines 
are made in Italy. About three-fourths of them are American. It 
is preferred to import machines because of the limited supply of iron, 
coal, and labor in Italy. 

The Government operation of tractors is done at about one-half of 
cost, but there seems to be no other way to furnish the necessary power 
and to overcome the labor shortage. It is expected that after the war 
the machines will be taken by larger farmers and by cooperative organi- 
zations on a basis of 20 per cent reduction for the former and 40 per 
cent reduction for the latter. 

Some agricultural machinery is made in Italy, but they depend 
largely upon importations. About one-third of the supply used to 
come from Germany. The total of these imports has been severely 
reduced. Thus the need for machinery has been accumulating in recent 
years, and now is very great, as is indicated by the following table : 



Importations of Agricultural MacMnery. 





Mowers and harvesters. 


other 


machines. 


Total. 


Year. 


Quantity 

in 
quintals. 


Value in 
lire. 


Quantity 

in 
quintals. 


Value in 
lire. 


Quantity 

in 
quintals. 


Value in 
lire. 


1910 


54,125 
63,183 
64.586 
52,461 
56,912 
39,212 
37,674 


6,495,000 
7,581,960 
7,756,320 
6,295,320 
6.109,440 
4.705.440 
5,462,730 


116.104 
123,355 
126.671 
101,458 
87,652 
41,670 
6,342 


15,093,520 
15,419,375 
15,833,875 
12,174,960 
10,610,240 
5,000,400 
919,590 


170,229 
186,538 
191,237 
153,919 
138.564 
80,882 
44,416 


21,588,520 


1911 


23,001,385 


1912 


23.583,707 


1913 


18,470,280 


1914 


16,627,680 


1915 


9,705.840 


1916 


6,382,320 







For the purpose of encouraging production the Government has 
established a moratorium on land rentals. Also, farmers may be per- 
mitted to remain on the land after their rent period expires if in the 
judgment of a special committee this is in the interest of food 
production. 



REPORT OF R. A. PEARSON. 



31 



Farmers are required to loan machinery to neighbors who are in 
need of this help to save their crops. This requirement, however, is 
not rigidly enforced. 

Rural credits are provided. The Government gives credit on crop 
security. If the crop fails, the security is placed on the next crop. 
Eventually the State assumes the risk if necessary. About seven 
million dollars have been advanced for this purpose through the Bank 
of Naples. This is only a small part of the funds thus advanced. The 
farmers pay legal interest, at first about 5 per cent, now 6 per cent, and 
this covers all expenses to the farmer. Rural credits have been known 
a long time in Italy, but the system has been strengthened and broad- 
ened on account of the war. 

The Government gives prizes for breaking up new ground. These 
amount to an addition of about 10 per cent to the price allowed on 
the product. These prizes are given also when it is shown that crops 
have been raised under exceptionally difficult conditions, and recently 
it has been recognized that the conditions are exceptionally difficult in 
most of Southern Italy and Sicily, besides smaller areas elsewhere. 
So that throughout these considerable parts of Italy all the farmers 
enjoy the prize allowances. 

FERTILIZERS. 

The fertilizer situation is causing much anxiety. Great dependence 
is placed upon imported fertilizers. The quantities of imports in 
recent years are shown in the following table. The increase of nitrates 
evidently is due to munition requirements, and do not result in material 
benefit in crop production. 



Annual Importations of Fertilizers. 
Quintals (220 pounds). 



Kinds. 


1912 


1913 


1914 


1915 


1916 


I. 

Mineral Phosphates. . 
Perphosp hates 


4.661,440 

370,320 

1, 181,900 

81,529 
134,660 

546,339 
211,902 


5,297,760 

722,280 

1,192,570 

70,606 
94,539 

674.176 
216,689 


5.139,980 

582,490 
232.240 

62,899 
37,083 

598.498 
131.100 


4,569,010 

137,650 

11,800 

15,687 
8,998 

727,298 
76.010 


4,814,250 
20,400 
27,160 


n. 

K CI 


9,211 


K2SO4 




ni. 

Crude NaNOs 

(NH4)2 SO4 


856,493 
28,237 







It is said that only about 16 per cent of the normal amount of phos- 
phates is now available. The phosphate question was referred to as 
the most serious agricultural question in Italy for the next few years. 
On considerable areas it has been the custom to secure nitrogen through 



32 REPORT OF AGRICT'LTURAL COM.MI.SSIOX TO EUROPE, 

alfalfa and to accumulate phosphate through its application each year 
for about three years. Then the land was plowed and planted to 
wheat without phosphate. The lack of this fertilizer during a short 
period of years is likely to have a serious effect for a prolonged period. 
In fact, farmers in the valley of the Po are now objecting to sowing 
grain because they can not secure fertilizer. The Government, how- 
ever, is requiring the i)lanting, although it is quite evident that many 
farmers will suffer losses on account of a decreased yield. It was 
stated by an agricultural official that if one ship could be provided to 
carry phosphates from Africa to Italy, this would be as great a help 
as would come from fifteen ships bringing grain from across the 
Atlantic to Italy. 

The potash question is not so serious. Some substitutes have been 
found for the usual forms of potash. These substitutes include olive 
oil residues and some local mineral deposits. Nitrates are made in 
Italy from water power, but the quantity available for agriculture is 
reduced to about one-third the normal amount because of munitions 
requirements. The situation is made still more difficult because ship- 
ments of ammonium sulphate are not now coming from England. 

FARM LABOR. 

The agricultural labor situation is very serious because of military 
service, which has fallen heavily upon Italian farms as upon other 
industries. Wages for Jabor have greatly increased. Great credit is 
given to women and children, whose services are described as "'heroic." 
On many farms they have undertaken to do all the work. In peace 
times it was not uncommon for women to work in the stables and to 
do some of the lighter work in the fields, but now thej'^ do heavy work 
as well. One official said : **It is unbelievable what women and chil- 
dren have done. One pities them." It was not uncommon to see two 
or three yoke of oxen driven by a boy of about ten years and drawing 
an old-style plow held by a woman. 

In sections of Italy where farmers live in villages and go sometimes 
six or eight miles to work on their little plots of land, it has become 
very difficult and sometimes impossible for the women and children to 
carry on the farming operations. In such cases the Government has 
given such assistance as it could — for example, through plowing the 
land with the use of tractors and soldiers, and even by appointing 
some person to take charge of the operations. In this way many thou- 
sands of acres have been retained in service. 

Farm labor now receives about four times the normal wage. For 
example, before the war wages varied from 3 to 7i/^ francs a day ; they 
now amount to 15 to 30 francs a day. Furthermore, a day's work on 



REPORT OF R. A. PEARSON 33 

a farm is limited to 10 hours, and in some districts to only 8 hours, 
a higher rate being required for extra time. It is not surprising to be 
told that Italian farmers who are too old to serve in the Army or who 
are exempted for other reasons, and their families, work very hard. 
The shortage of labor is, of course, primarily due to the large number 
of enlistments for service in the Army, but also to the withdrawal of 
other men to serve as laborers. About 00,000 Italian workmen have 
been sent to France for different forms of labor behind the lines. Many 
prisoners also, taken in Italy, have been sent to France. Many thou- 
sands of workmen were required to make highways and railroads in 
the mountains in the north of Italy. 

This year the farm-labor situation was so serious that crops were 
in danger. The War Department recognized the need and released for 
harvest work the troops stationed throughout the country and known 
as territorial troops. Also, they released for harvest work the entire 
1900 class of young men. All of these were compelled to work on farms. 

The Army allows, also, leave from military service to farm pro- 
prietors or to principal farm operators when their presence is neces- 
sary to assure food crops and providing the farm to which they return 
produces a gross value of crops not less than $12,000. Also, small 
farmers of the peasant class may be exempted for agricultural work 
when no male between 16 and 65 years of age remains on the farm 
and the help of a man is deemed necessary. Such persons are released 
on leaves of absence running three months, which may be renewed for 
the same length periods. Exemptions are granted also for three-month 
periods which may be renewed, if circumstances require, to vine and 
tree (especially olive) pruners; mechanics and engineers employed on 
large farms; experienced milkers in large dairies; chief teamsters and 
stable foremen; tree grafters and some other experts. But all exemp- 
tions are limited to men of 35 years of age or over, and the total 
number of such exemptions for all Italy is limited to 120,000. 

Exemption from military service is allowed to agricultural advisers 
stationed throughout the different provinces and 26 years of age or 
older. But this is not considered an exemption, as such men are taken 
into the Army and then ordered back to their agricultural work. They 
are not permitted to serve in the Army even if they want to. No 
exemption is given for agricultural or other experts stationed at the 
universities, but it is recognized that some of these men should be 
retained in their scientific work in the interest of food production. 

Enemy soldiers who have been taken prisoners are used in three 
ways — for agricultural work, for work in the forests and mines, and 
for miscellaneous labor behind the lines. In agricultural work the 
prisoners are usually kept scattered with less than ten in a place and 
always under guard. As a rule, the prisoners and Italian soldiers 



34 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

are paid about the same as civilian labor, but the payments go to the 
Ministry of War. In order to get more satisfactory help from such 
labor it is customary for the farmer to make an allowance of extra 
food and wine. 

The labor shortage has been so great that the Government also is 
using civil prisoners and convicts for different kinds of work and, of 
course, under guard. 



REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 35 



REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 



ENGLAND AND WALES— INCREASED ACREAGE OF HUMAN 
FOOD CROPS AND DECREASE OF FEED CROPS AND GRASS. 

One of the most conspicuous effects of the war on crop production 
in England and Wales is the increase of acreage of crops more or 
less directly available for human food such as the important cereals 
and potatoes. 

The decrease of acreage of forage crops, such as pulse, roots, hay, 
and pasture is also conspicuous. 

Thus the cereals and potatoes show the following contrasts : 

1918 1917 1905-14 

Wheat, barley, oats, rye (acres) 6,979,130 5,637,190 5,294,286 

Potatoes do 633,840 507,990 434,949 

Total do 7,602,970 6,145,080 5,729,235 

The cereals show an increase of 23.8 per cent over 1917, and 32 per 
cent over the 10-year pre-war average. This is the largest acreage 
of cereals since 1879. 

Potatoes show an increase of 25 per cent over 1917 and of 45 per cent 
over the 10-year pre-war average. This is said to be much the largest 
acreage of potatoes on record. 

The acreage of peas and beans, which to a large extent are raised 
for stock feed, shows a decrease of 0.034 per cent below that of 1917 and 
of 0.041 per cent below the 10-year pre-war average, while the acreage 
of grass, including both hay and pasture, shows a decrease of 0.079 
per cent below 1917 and of 0.083 per cent below the 10-year pre-war 
average. 

While the wisdom of this enlargement of human food and horse 
crops at the expense of cattle, i)ig, and poultry forage, in view of the 
war emergency, is not to be doubted, when taken in connection with 
the adverse season for roots it explains in large part the acute situa- 
tion now existing with respect to shortage of stock feed. This has 
been accentuated by the necessity for taking unexpectedly large ton- 
nage for troop transport from America which might .otherwise have 
been available for importation of concentrates. 

In view of the prolonged and extreme depletion of manpower due 
to withdrawals for military service, the 10.2 per cent increase of land 
under cultivation, amounting to 1,152,620 acres in England and Wales, 
is evidence of the energy and effectiveness with which the farmers 



36 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

under the leadership and with the assistance of national and local 
authorities have met the urgent need for larger home production of 
staple food crops. While in the main this has been accomplished 
through persuasion, drastic action even to the extent of dispossessing 
inefficient tenants and of taking, clearing, and operating idle land 
at the expense of the owner and regardless of his desire, was in some 
cases taken. Authority for this was found under the Defense of the 
Realm Act, maximum production of essential crops being considered 
a public necessity in the face of which adverse private and individual 
interest must give way. In like fashion the planting of certain very 
profitable cash crops such as mustard was restricted by local authori- 
ties in favor of staple food crops and reduction of acreage of such 
crops as strawberries and hops was accomplished through persuasion 
and the influence of public sentiment. 

SEED SUPPLIES. 

This vital essential to crop production received much attention 
in both France and England. In the former country, which under 
normal conditions exports both field-crop and vegetable seeds much 
more largely than she imports them, little special governmental ac- 
tion was taken other than restraint of exports through requiring the 
securing of permits for export shipments of seeds. The most notable 
exceptions appear to have been winter wheat, spring wheat, and 
sugar-beet seed. 

To make possible tlie largest production of breadstufifs considerable 
importations of Canadian spring wheat were made both in 1917 and 
1918. Though this grain is commonly but little grown in France, 10 
per cent of the total wheat acreage in 1917 and 6 per cent of that of 
1918 consisted of spring wheat. While not yielding as well as the 
winter wheat it appears to have answered a very useful purpose in 
the food emergency. For sugar-beet seed France had for many years 
relied on imports from Germany and Austria. These were cut ofif 
when the war started, simultaneously with the taking of approximately 
80 per cent of the beet-sugar factories and beet-growing territory. 
Some progress in sugar-beet seed production in France has been made 
during the past two years but imports of considerable magnitude will 
be necessary if the French beet-sugar industry is to be reconstituted 
to any large extent during 1919, which at this date appears doubtful. 

In England it was found necessary for the Government to purchase 
considerable quantities of seed wheat and oats of approved varieties, 
for sale to farmers. To supplement the forage production several 
thousand bushels of South African maize was imported. This is a 
comparatively unknown crop in England, where the seasons are too 



REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 37 

short for corn to ripen, but the fields observed were yielding fair 
crops of forage. Most of this was fed green to cattle, silos being 
practically unknown. 

The apparent certainty that the reconstitution of agriculture in 
France and Belgium will be well under way by planting time in the 
spring of 1919 renders the question of effective distribution of the 
existing world stocks of staple-crop forage and vegetable seeds one 
of the most vitally important to the food supply of western Europe 
and America at this time. Clover, lucerne (alfalfa), cabbage, rutabaga, 
turnip, mangel, and sugar beet are some of the important crops of 
which the yield for 1918 appear to have been relatively light in most 
countries. Demands from the farmers in liberated Belgium and 
France, in addition to those likely to arise in certain of the northern 
neutrals and probably from Germany and Austria also, render the 
conditions peculiarly favorable for speculative manipulation at the 
expense of the farmers who must have seed promptly if they are 
to produce crops next year and therefore to endanger production in 
1919. 

Unless through prompt international action the approximate stocks 
and requirements of the vitally important seeds for each country 
can be determined as a basis for the administration of the existing 
export restricting regulations in force in the sevei*al countries with 
respect to seeds, the prospect for prompt restoration of normal pro- 
duction in several of the countries will be seriously impaired. The 
existing conditions tend to favor the forcing of seed prices to destruc- 
tively high points and thus to endanger the welfare of our own farmers 
as well as of those of the allied countries. Prompt consideration of 
the matter by an International Council on xVgricultural Production 
with vigorous and effective action by the proper agencies in the 
respective governments would seem the most practical way to handle 
the matter. 

In Great Britain one of the distinct agricultural advances made 
which appears likely to endure is that accomplished through the so- 
called "Testing of Seeds Order" of the Board of Agriculture and 
Fisheries under which sellers of agricultural seeds are required to 
declare the purity and germination of seeds offered for sale. This is 
applicable to seeds of all the more important cereals when sold for 
seed, as well as to the leading grass and forage-crop seeds and the 
leading vegetable seeds when sold in quantities in excess of from 6 
ounces to 2 pounds. 

Its operation will insure to the purchaser of seed intended for plant- 
ing, authoritative information as to the name and address of the seller 
of the seed, the purity, the germination within six months of sale, and 



38 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

in the case of many specified seeds the name of the country where 
grown as well as the name of the variety. 

If more than 1 per cent by weight of injurious weed seeds be 
present the total percentage of such weed seeds must also be stated. 

The law is applicable to farmers who sell seed, except that farmers 
may sell seeds ''as grown" to a merchant, without having a test made, 
in such case merely stating the name of the variety. 

Packages of vegetable seeds below a certain weight must reach a 
prescribed standard of germination. If the seed falls below this 
standard the fact must be declared at time of purchase. 

This step to protect farmers and gardeners and reduce the produc- 
tion risk resulting from the unknowing use of impure seed or seed 
of low vitality is regarded as a reform of very great importance. It 
is said to have met with the hearty cooperation of the British seed 
trade and to have yielded distinctly beneficial results in 1918, the 
first year of its operation. 

SEED POTATOES. 

The importance of the potato as the crop most capable of quick 
enlargement under British conditions to supplement the deficient 
supply of bread grains was early appreciated in Great Britain. Vari- 
ous methods of stabilizing prices and stimulating production were 
tried during the early years of the war. As was true in North America, 
however, the crop of 1910, due chiefly to adverse climatic condi- 
tions, fell short of the consuming requirements at a time when the 
submarine menace to the importation of foodstuff's was distinctly 
ominous to the national welfare. This brought about unprecedentedly 
high prices for potatoes for both food and seed at a time when every 
effort was being made to stimulate maximum production both by com- 
mercial growers and allotment holders who were aiming to produce 
their family supplies. In addition to the control of prices of pota- 
toes for food use, the Ministry of Food accordingly established maxi- 
mum prices for seed potatoes, by varieties and classes, applicable to™« 
the seed required for planting the crop of 1917. In addition to recog- 
nizing the difference in value of different varieties of potatoes, the 
relative values of stock one year removed and two years removed from 
Scotland and Ireland were recognized by price differences ranging 
from 25 to 33^ per cent. This was accomplished by establishing 
three qualities of seed potatoes of each important variety as follows : 

Class I. Seed potatoes grown in Scotland or Ireland in 191G. 

II. Seed potatoes grown in England or Wales in 1916 from 
seed grown in Scotland or Ireland in 1916. 
III. Seed potatoes grown in England or Wales in 1916 from 
seed grown in Scotland or Ireland in 1915. 



REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 39 

In accordance with, a fixed schedule of maximum prices to the 
grower the price of seed potatoes of each class of each important 
variety was established. For example, in the spring of 1917 the 
maximum price to growers of seed potatoes of the 1916 crop of Early 
Puritan variety in Scotland and Ireland was £12 per ton. At the 
same time the price of Early Puritan grown in England or Wales 
from seed grown in Scotland or Ireland in 1915 was £11 per tern, 
while the stock grown in 1916 from seed of the same variety grown 
in England or Wales in 1915 was but £9. 

The prices of seed of some thirty of the leading varieties were 
fixed in this way, the effort being to maintain the differences of seed 
value that are more or less generally recognized by British potato 
growers. Standard sizes for seed potatoes expressed in terms of mesh 
of riddle were also set. Apprehensive lest the supply of seed should 
prove insufficient for the planting requirements, the prices were soon 
raised considerably above the initial schedule, the government pur- 
chasing for sale to commercial planters and allotment holders, seed 
potatoes to a total value of £200,000. 

The exigent conditions of the prospective food supply continuing 
to some extent when preparation for the planting of the crop of 1918 
needed to be made, three lines of government provision of seed were 
decided upon. 

The first, when completed, involved the purchase for sale to growers 
of 11,000 tons of seed potatoes of varieties immune to the wart disease, 
for use in districts where the soils are infected with that destructive 
trouble. The required quantities were found in Scotland, England, 
•uid Ireland at an average cost of £8 10s. per ton for the seed. Ifl 
this way the inevitable losses to be expected from the planting of 
ordinary sorts on infected soils were protected against. 

The provision of adequate supplies of seed of varieties immune 
to the wart disease is recognized as one of the most vital necessities of 
the British potato production for the near future. To meet this the 
Government contracted for the growing in Scotland and Ireland of 
1,000 acres of the most promising of the newer resistant varieties in 
1918 for seed for 1919, at a cost estimated at £44,000. Availability of 
immune seed is more necessary because the planting of infected land 
with susceptible varieties is prohibited by the Wart Disease Orders. 

The second line involved the provision of seed potatoes of desirable 
non-immune sorts to small growers in order to encourage production 
of home supplies for village and suburban families. This undertaking 
attained a magnitude of 11,000 tons at a cost of £8 per ton and assisted 
materially in the carrying through of the allotment holders' movement 
which marks the English landscape everywhere this year. 



10 



REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



The third potato effort was instituted and carried forward until 

blocked by the German drive in March, 1918. This contemplated the 

planting of some 13,000 tons of seed potatoes, worth approximateli?^ 

£100,000, in the regions of France behind the British Army lines where 

both soil and climatic conditions were considered favorable for potato 

growing. Some 9,000 tons of this seed reached France, but because of 

the German drive the larger part could not be planted. 

I 

POTATO CROP OF 1918. 

The securing of the largest possible acreage of potatoes in 1918, 
being considered a matter of urgent national importance, the Food 
Controller in January, 1918, announced a policy of contracting with 
farmere to grow potatoes for the Government on substantially the 
following conditions : 

1. The total acreage grown on each farm or holding in question 

must not be less in 1918 than in 1917. 

2. Cultural, spraying, and harvesting and storing directions of 

the Board of Agriculture must be followed out. 

It was announced at the same time that as from November 1, 1918, 
the Food Controller would purchase the entire potato crop of Great 
Britain grown in lots of one acre or more, except where grown for 
consumption on the growers farm or for experimental purposes or 
for seed potatoes. 

Basis prices for England and Wales and for Scotland were 
announced at the same time. These were established on an increasing 
scale from November 1, 1918, to May 1, 1919, and as will be noted 
from the following table were higher for England and Wales than for 
Scotland. It was also announced that the purchase price would event- 
ually be assessed with due regard to the size and quality of the crop, 
but in no case less for sound potatoes than the following scale : 



Potato prices. 



Time of delivery. 



November and December. 1918. 
January and February, 1919. . . 

March and April, 1919 

May, 1919. to end of season 



Price per ton. 



England 
and Wales. 



£5 

£5 10s. 

£6 

£6 10s. 



Scotland. 



£4 10s. 

£5 

£5 10s. 

£6 



The prices for seed and undersized iwtatoes will be announced in due course, but every 
grower will have the right to retain any seed he may require for his own use. 

The higher jprice basis for England and Wales was expressly stated 
to be for the purpose of stimulating production in the territory near- 
est the principal consuming areas and in recognition of the fact that 



REPORT OP WM. A. TAYLOR. 41 

Scottish farmers obtain their seed cheaper than English farmers and 
secure higher prices for it when sold. 

GOVERNMENT PURCHASE PRICES FOR POTATOES AS DETERMINED IN 

THE AUTUMN OF 1918. 

During hearings in fifteen potato-growing sections of England and 
Wales, which extended through the month of September, 1918, effort 
was made to ascertain the approximate cost of production in each 
district and to some extent the difference in cost of production of 
different varieties or types of potatoes. 

The prices announced late in October were as follows : 

In accordance with an announcement made at the beginning of this year, 
the Food Controller on November 1 will take control of the whole potato crop 
of England and Wales. The arrangements in respect of the Scottish and Irish 
crops will be announced later. 

The prices to be paid to the growers have been fixed by a Commission, under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Rigby Smith, K. C, M. P., appointed by the Food Con- 
troller and the President of the Board of Agriculture jointly. The report of 
this Commission has just been issued. It prescribes different growers' prices 
for different areas, according to the size of the crop and the quality of the 
potatoes. 

The prices per ton, free on rail, during November and December for Grade 1 
potatoes (King Edward, Golden Wonder, Langworthy, What's Wanted, and 
Main Crop varieties) are as follows: 

Sussex, £8; Wilts, Hants, Berks, Bucks, and Oxford, £7 10s; Kent. Surrey, 
Herts, Neds, Middlesex, Dorset, Somerset, Gloucester, Devon, Cornwall, Suffolk, 
Lancaster, Cheshire, Monmouth, Wales, £7; Hereford, Worcester, Warwick, 
Shropshire, Stafford, Derby, Leicester, North Hants, Rutland, Northumberland, 
Cumberland, Westmoreland, Durham, £6 15s.; Nottingham, Yorkshire, and other 
than blacklands in Lincolnshire, Soke of Peterborough, Norfolk, Cambridge, and 
Hunts, £6 10s.; blacklands in Soke of Peterborough, Lincolnshire and Norfolk, 
£6; blacklands in Cambridge and Hunts, £5 15s. 

Prices for Grade 2 potatoes (which include all other varieties than those 
mentioned above) are in all cases 10s. less. 

While the prices to producers will thus vary in different areas, the price to 
the public for the same grade of potato will be uniform throughout England and 
Wales. Until the end of December Grade 1 potatoes will be retailed at a uni- 
form price of IV^d. per lb. and Grade 2 at a uniform price of Id. per lb. Lower 
prices will be fixed for large retail sales. In January the retail prices will be 
raised to li4d. per lb. for Grade 2 and l%d. per lb. for Grade 1 potatoes. 

The potatoes will be supplied to retailers at a uniform price fixed condition- 
ally at £9 per ton for Grade 1 potatoes and at £7 per ton for Grade 2 potatoes, 
the price being reckoned in each case to the retailer's nearest railway station. 
The wholesalers will thus buy from the growers at varying prices, and sell 
in all cases to retailers at a flat price. In doing so they will act as agents of 
the Ministry of Food, at a commission which has been fixed, provisionally, at 
7s. 6d. per ton, and they will account to the Ministry for the difference between 
the price paid to the grower and the price obtainable from the retailer after 
deducting their commission and necessary charges. Both the retailer's buying 



42 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

price and the wholesaler's commission are subject to revision when further In- 
formation as to actual cost has been obtained. 

Deficit and Surplus Zones. 

For purposes of administration England and Wales have been divided into 
11 deficit zones, which will need at some time or other during the year to im- 
port potatoes from elsewhere, and 12 surplus zones, which will export potatoes 
(particularly to London and the other large industrial centers). In each sur- 
plus zone is a Zonal Committee, under a zonal chairman, responsible for organiz- 
ing the collection of potatoes for export to other areas. In each deficit zone is a 
Potato Control Committee, under the chairmanship of the Food Commissioner. 
These committees will be empowered to. issue directions relating to the collec- 
tion and disposal of potatoes. For example, they may require potatoes of good 
keeping qualities to be held back until later in the year, so that those which 
will not keep may be absorbed first. 

Subject to any restrictions imposed by the Potato Control Committee or the 
Zonal Committee, growers will be permitted to sell potatoes to any registered 
wholesale dealer in their zone but may not sell to anyone else, except under 
license to be obtained from the Food Commissioner of their area. Sales under 
such licenses will be made at the appropriate price for the class of sale author- 
ized, but growers of more than five acres will be required, as a condition of 
obtaining such a license, to pay a fee so adjusted as to secure that their net 
receipts are equivalent to the growers' price fixed for their district, together with 
any sum required to cover the cost of additional cartage and a commission of 
2s. 6d. per ton. Growers of less than five acres of potatoes will not, as a rule, 
be required to pay this fee. 

The outcome of this effort to stimulate the production of an essen- 
tial perishable crop through recognition of regional and varietal differ- 
ences in cost of production and with a view to securing the larger in- 
creases in the sections where the article is most needed for con- 
sumption is a matter of distinct public interest to the United States. 
In view of the possibility of the occurrence of similar emergencies in 
the future its practical workings should be carefully studied as they 
develop. 

FLAX. 

At one time considerable fiber flax was grown in England, but as the 
result of a general decline in special crop production and of competi- 
tion with the increasing production of Russia the industry had prac- 
tically ceased to exist many years ago. In 1913, however, experiments 
looking toward the revival of flax production were begun at a Flax 
Experiment Station established by the University of Leeds at Selby in 
Yorkshire, where the conditions were considered favorable for such 
a test. At that point a considerable number of farmers had had 
experience in the growing of flax in their earlier years. Thorough test 
of the practicability of standardizing the retting process and the 



KEI'ORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 43 

practicability of central retting stations for groups of farmers were 
in mind. This work began with plantings of 117 acres in 1913, and con- 
tinued on about the same scale of operation through 1914, 1915 and 
1910. At points in Somersetshire and elsewhere experimental pro- 
duction of flax was also under way. Under the impetus of rapid in- 
crease of prices for fibre and the urgent need of it for airplane con- 
struction, Ihe acreage of this crop in England rose in 1918 to 18,400 
acres, more than seven times that of 1917, and said to be the largest 
but two in the past fifty years. Those in charge of the very active 
government campaign for flax production appeared confident that the 
quantity and quality of the crop would be found to justify the effort 
put forth and the large expenditure made. While much had been 
expected of pulling machines recently developed in America for the 
harvesting of this crop, we were informed that in England recourse 
to hand pulling had been necessary. This necessitated the employ- 
ment of English soldiers, women, boy scouts and all other available 
labor and also the bringing in at heavy expense of a considerable 
number of men from Ireland experienced in flax pulling. 

Farmers who planted flax were guaranteed a return of at least £10 
per acre through a price of £S 10s. per ton for the flax in the seed, 
the Government securing and paying for the labor required for pulling 
the crop. Where the crop did well yields of 2 to 21/^ tons per acre 
were secured. Deseeding and scutching were to be done with improved 
labor-saving machinery and canal and lank retting was to be prac- 
ticed. While Ireland was not visited, we were informed that the flax 
acreage there showed an increase of about 25 per cent over last year 
and is much in excess of pre-war production of this crop. 

As all information indicates that world stocks of flax fiber and 
linen fabric are unprecedentedly low as the result of the disorganiza- 
tion of production in Russia, Belgium and Northern France, it would 
appear advisable that steps be taken to ascertain somewhat in detail 
through expert investigation, the nature and extent of the progress 
now being made in Canada, England and Ireland in the development 
of special methods and machinery for the growth and preparation of 
this crop. 

Some progress has been made with it in the northern United States, 
especially in Michigan and Wisconsin. It is understood that the chief 
retarding factors have been variable weather, adversely affecting uni- 
formity of quality and yield of fiber from year to year, and the heavy 
labor cost of preparing the crop. 

WAR GARDENS. 

In both France and England the garden is a more universal feature 
of the suburban as well as the farm home than in most parts of 



44 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

America. Apparently the possibility of food shortage was realized 
very soon after the war began and steps taken to stimulate war 
gardening. In France little more than suggestion appears to have been 
necessary to bring the full available human power to bear effectively. 
In Britain local food production societies were organized and local 
town and District Councils were authorized to take possession of any 
suitable unoccupied land and allot it to the towns people for planting. 
The total number of "allotments" thus cultivated in 1918 in England 
and Wales is estimated at 1,400,000. As the climatic conditions make 
possible the continued growth of many vegetable crops throughout 
the winter, as well as during the summer, the addition to the food 
supply thus accomplished was very considerable. The psychological 
effect of such activity upon the home forces was also excellent and 
effective in maintaining morale at home when the military conditions 
were not encouraging. 

ARMY GARDENS. 

Early in the war the French made provision for the systematic pro- 
duction of vegetables by their soldiers wherever a sufficient force was 
quartered for a long enough time to justify such plantings. During 
1918 some 7,000 separate military gardens, totaling some 40,000 acres, 
were thus maintained. These varied in size from a few square yards 
to several acres and furnished a large part of the fresh food supply 
for the French troops. 

The central feature of the general plan was a 65 acre vegetable 
plant nursery at Versailles, where seedlings of such crops as cabbage, 
cauliflower, onions, leeks, and various salads were grown under inten- 
sive conditions to a size suitable for transplantation. These were 
then shipped by motor or rail transport to the places where they were 
needed for planting out. Between April, 1917, and October, 1918, 
some 70,000,000 vegetable plants were shipped from this garden in 
this way, shipments during the month of October, 1918, being approxi- 
mately 20,000,000 plants. Fifty-six other seedling nurseries were also 
maintained at different points. This activity, though under the direc- 
tion of a Lieutenant of the French Army as Chief Garden Officer, was 
chiefly supported by funds contributed for the purpose by persons inter- 
ested. 

In cooperation with this a beginning was made in 1918 in the estab- 
lishment of army gardens for the American troops in France through 
which 146 such gardens were established at various points. Greatly 
enlarged operations were contemplated for 1919. 

The British Army agricultural activities comprised gardens at 
camps in the home countries where the principal crops growTi were 



REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 45 

vegetables, including potatoes. In these some six or seven thousand 
acres were utilized in 1918. 

A project for the production of crops on some 50,000 acres in the 
zone of British occupation in France was inaugurated early in 1918 
with a view to producing cereals and potatoes on a large scale. Funds, 
tractors, implements, and seeds were provided but the operation as 
a whole was seriously interfered with by the German advance in 
March. Notwithstanding this, several thousand acres of grain were 
ultimately harvested by the British forces as a result of the plantings 
made. 

Extensive crop production work was also undertaken by the British 
in connection with the Salonica Expeditionary Force and in Mesopo- 
tamia. 

The whole agricultural work of the British Army was under the 
advisory direction of an Army Agricultural Committee, of which 
Viscount Harcourt was chairman. 

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION. 

The advance of cooperative organization in agriculture in England 
does not appear to have been materially affected by the war. The 
advantage of consolidated selling of produce and purchase of feed- 
stuffs and fertilizers appears to have been rather less conspicuous than 
in normal times. This was doubtless to a considerable extent due to 
the fact that the prices of so large a proportion of what the farmer 
had to sell and needed to buy were fixed by regulation, leaving little 
to be determined through competitive buying and selling. 

The prevailing type of cooperative marketing organization differs 
from that which is most familiar in this country in that the English 
association actually buys the produce of its members in competition 
with other buyers, and having done so sells it for the association 
account. Any profit on the transaction thus goes to the association 
for ultimate division among the entire membership rather than directly 
to the farmers whose produce was sold or through pooling of proceeds 
of like sales, as is the case in most such organizations in the United 
States. 

The membership and volume of business of existing organizations 
has increased considerably and the members appear to have turned a 
larger portion of their individual business through their association 
channels but not many additional such organizations appear to have 
been formed. 

The general and unusual wartime prosperity of the British farmer 
has not specially encouraged him to cooperate. Adversity, not prosper- 
ity, is the mother of effective agricultural cooperation. 



4f* REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. 

The thoughtful observer of agricultural conditions in these countries 
can hardly fail to be impressed with the radically different situation 
that exists in them. 

France, with her long-maintained policy of self-feeding, must in every 
way exert herself to restore her crop and live-stock production to the 
pre-war normal at the earliest practicable date. In view of her depleted 
manpower and of the peasant type of farm operation which is to a 
considerable extent inherent in the long-prevailing system of land 
ownership and inheritance, this is certain to be a slow and difficult 
process. Apparently it will involve largely increased supplies of 
fertilizer, implements, and the provision of additional agricultural 
labor to that of the French people. Prior to the war, agricultural 
production in France appears to have reached the approximate maxi- 
mum likely to be attained with the available supply of labor, until 
consolidation of holdings into farm units of more effective operating 
size makes possible the larger application of machinery in the ordinary 
operations of the farm. There is every indication that France will 
need to import cereals, meat, and sugar for a number of years to come 
in larger proportion than before the war. 

In the portions of Britain visited, the maintenance of tb» enlarged 
war production of food crops or even a material further enlargement 
will apparently be determined chiefly by whether it will pay to raise 
more at home rather than to exchange manufactured goods for the 
foodstuffs of her colonies and other countries. The undeveloped 
potential food resources of England are obvious in the large acreage 
devoted to parks, estates, and game preserves, as well as in the extrava- 
gantly numerous and wasteful hedges that characterize the farms. 
The manpower, notwithstanding the losses during the war, is appar- 
ently ample, provided the man and the land are brought into effective 
combination. 

Leaving aside the possibility of future war interference with trans- 
portation, the agronomically sound policy would appear to be to con- 
centrate even more largely on live stock and perishables than hereto- 
fore and continue to rely in large part on other countries for cereals 
• which, notwithstanding lighter yields per acre, can in many countries 
be grown and delivered to Britain at distinctly less cost than she 
can produce them. 

For the immediate future, especially the crop year 1919, the pro- 
duction of staple crops in both England and France will depend more 
upon the character of the weather than is usually the case. This is 
especially true of winter wheat which has gone into the ground with 
less fertilizer and with less thorough preparation than is common. 



REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR, 47 

Apparently, too, the crop was being sown later than usual because 
of the adverse weather for preparation of the land. In France this 
was due to prolonged drouth ; in England to prolonged rainy weather 
during Augiist, September and October. Under these conditions it 
appears probable that the production of wheat in both England and 
France will show material decline in 1919 below 1018, even if the 
acreage of those years is maintained. 



48 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 



LIVE STOCK CONDITIONS IN EUROPE. 
THE UNITED KINGDOM. 

Parming and live stock raising are very closely associated in the 
United Kingdom. Soil and climatic conditions and the innate con- 
servatism of British character are largely responsible for this condi- 
tion. The British farmer, however, unlike his neighbors in Holland 
and Denmark, has usually been an individualist. Cooperative effort 
has had very little support, but it is now a matter of serious discus- 
sion among leaders in agricultural affairs. 

In a general way we may say that live stock farming in the United 
Kingdom in normal times has been directed with three general pur- 
poses in mind: 

a. To furnish manure for the maintenance of soil fertility. The 
British farmer who merely breaks even in direct profits on his feeding 
has a profit in the manure. This fact explains the dependence of the 
farmer on high-protein feeds, such as the various oil cakes. Circum- 
stances and centuries of experience have thoroughly ground into the 
British farmer's mind that the maintenance of soil fertility is the 
first and most fundamental problem of farming. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that grain yields are maintained in Great Britain at much 
higher averages per acre than in America. 

h. To make a direct profit in commercial feeding for meat and milk 
production. Great Britain has always been the world's most dis- 
criminating market for choice meats of all kinds. The home meat 
products have been famous as the best the world produces. Prime 
Scotch beef, Southdown mutton, Yorkshire ham, and Wiltshire bacon 
are conceded to be the world's standards in choice and appetizing 
meats. 

Beef and mutton are produced in normal times on pastures in 
sjiummer and by straw and roots in winter. Oil cakes form the chief 
supplements to the ration. Since the war the supply of oil cakes has 
declined so that meat production has suffered somewhat. 

Dairying in England is unique. The dairy cow of England, and 
to a considerable extent of Scotland also, is a Shorthorn, bred to 
furnish abundant milk on the rich pastures and to drop a calf which 
can be fattened for beef. Guernseys and Jerseys have never made much 
headway commercially, but Holsteins are just now having quite a run 
in popular favor, the descendants of an importation made trom Hol- 
land just before the war selling at very good prices. 



REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 



49 



c. To produce high-class pedigree breeding stock. A greater number of 
useful breeds of cattle, sheep, pigs, and horses has been developed iji 
Great Britain than anywhere else in the world. Probably half of the 
world's meat, as well as a large part of the world's wool, comes from 
animals which trace directly to parent stocks in Britain. 

The condition of British herds during the war : 



LIVE STOCK IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. 

MEAT ANIMALS. 



Country and Class of 
Animals. 


1909 


1914 


1917 


1918 


United Kingdom : 


4,360,982 
11,761,830 
31,839,799 

3,543,331 

435,110 
1,176,165 
7,328,265 

129.819 

1,666,806 
4,740,848 
4,221,380 
1,162,444 

2,359.086 

5,844,817 

20,290,154 

2,251,068 

2,091,743 
204,490 
528,806 

1,348,503 


4,595,128 
12,184.505 
27,963.977 

3,952.615 

453,703 
1,214,974 
7,025,820 

152,768 

1.657.205 
5.091.587 
3,678,463 
1,318,366 

2,484.220 
5,877,944 
17,259,694 
2,481,481 

2,237,783 
209,360 
619,028 

1,399.547 


4,514.803 
12,382,236 
27,867,244 

3,007,916 

441,802 
1,209.859 
6,873,234 

132,945 

1,608,207 

4,945,229 

3,824,153 

956,430 

2,464,794 

6,227,148 

17,169,857 

1,918,541 

2,190,318 
210,048 
597,692 

1,372,822 


(a) 


All cattle . . . 


(a) 




(a) 


Pigs 


(a) 


Scotland : 


451,949 


All cattle 


1,208,696 


Sheep 


6,863,168 


Pigs 


127,615 


Ireland : 


(a) 


All cattle 


(a) 




(a) 


Pigs 


(a) 


England and Wales : 


2,577,970 


All cattle 


6.200.490 


Sheep 


16,476,180 


PigB 


1.697,070 


Horses on Farms : 


(a) 




209,883 




(a) 




1.375,830 







a Figures for Ireland not available. 



a. Cattle in Great Britain are more numerous now tlian they were 
ten years ago, and there has been a steady increase in their numbers 
during the war. They are not maintained in as high condition as 
formerly, except on grass. Store cattle are very high in price, and 
this, with the shortage of concentrates, will cause a decreased amount 
of feeding during the coming winter. A shortage of native beef in 
Great Britain may, therefore, be expected from January to May, in- 
clusive. 



50 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

The beef cattle situation would have been in better shape had farmers 
early in the war begun to adopt the practice of marketing at earlier 
ages. As a means to meet the existing feed emergency this is now 
impossible, as it requires several years' time to put such a change into 
effect. 

6. From the standpoint of numbers alone, dairy cows are holding 
their own in Great Britain. Thus far the milk supply has been suffi- 
ciently well maintained for essential purposes. At the time we left 
Great Britain, however, there was much concern whether there were 
sufficient supplies of concentrated feed to keep up milk supplies during 
the coming winter. 

In view of the peculiar system of live stock production possible and 
usually followed in Great Britain, namely, many itufnths' dependence 
on grass with a winter maintenance on straw or hay ^tud roots, clover 
and other leguminous hays are not so common as in most parts of ti e 
United States. In fact, they are exceptional. Hay is usually tLi 
cutting from a grass crop which has not been pastured. Of the 19 
million acres of grass land in Great Britain, in 1918 less than two 
million acres were grown in a rotation as a hay crop. Alfalfa is un- 
important. The protein in the dairy cow's ration is therefore obtained 
from the concentrated feed. Milling by-products and oil cakes are thus 
absolutely essential for this purpose. In the rationing of farm ani- 
mals which the Government expects to put into effect this month 
(November) preference in all cases is given dairy cows in milk. The 
ration, however, is under the normal requirement, being 2.4 pounds 
l>er head daily of grain offals and 2.4 pounds per head daily of oil 
cakes. 

Those dairymen who have foreseen the winter shortage of cake 
withheld it during the summer while the cows were on pasture. With 
the best of conditions and careful economy in the use of home supplies, 
and with such additional amounts as are made available by importa- 
tions, the maintenance of the milk supply in England will still be a 
difficult problem during the coming winter. It will be made possible 
il the 153,000 tons of oilcake recommended by the Inter-Allied Food 
Conference to be exported from the United States is approved. 

c. Sheep were declining in Great Britain before the war for the 
same reasons as existed in the United States. They have increased 
in numbers since the beginning of the war on account of the increase in 
the prices of wool and meat. The last year saw a decline in numbers 
owing to the blizzard of April 17, 1917. This storm was the worst in 
many years. It occurred in the midst of the lambing season and 
swept over Scotland and northern England with disastrous effect. The 
present prices for fat ewes are the same as for fat wethers of equal 
weight. This has sent many ewes to market, especially in the fall of 



REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 51 

/ 

1917. The labor shortage has also tended to cause the marketing of 
tlocks, especially in those parts of England where lambs and sheep 
are handled on forage crops. Pastured or "grass" sheep do not seem 
to have been affected by the labor shortage. These are the three prin- 
cipal causes for the falling off in the numbers of sheep during the 
year. Considerable criticism is indulged in of the Government's policy 
in handling the wool clip, but it does not seem to be causing any 
farmers to dispose of their flocks. The Government price on wool in 
Great Britain is much less than in the United States, but it is quite a 
little more than pre-war prices. 

d. Pigs were increasing in the United Kingdom before the war. 
Since then they have declined sharply owing to the shortage of con- 
centrates. The decline during the past year has been marked and the 
great shortage of concentrated feed expected during the next winter 
has caused the Government to announce that there will be no concen- 
trated pig feed available for commercial pigs after January 1. Farmers 
have been given notice to dispose of their feeding pigs by that date. 

e. Horses are worth in Great Britain at least twice what they were 
worth before the war. Farm horses worth |250 to f 350 each before 
the war now bring |500 to |750. Fine heavy geldings for city trade 
bring higher prices, sales from |1,000 to |1,650 each having been 
reported. 

The military demands have made heavy inroads on the supply of 
British farm horses, and the increase in the acreage of tillable land 
has augmented the farm demand. It is said that the war has caused 
a great increase in the use of ponies and donkeys for light work in 
cities and towns. 

/. Poultry, especially chickens, have fallen off. Like pigs, poultry 
are largely maintained on purchased feed (grain). Wherever the 
system of ranging in fields from colony houses is followed the flocks 
seem to be maintained. This practice, however, is not common. Poultry 
are not often seen in the stubble fields. 

g. Pedigree stocks of all classes are being maintained at or above 
the pre-war numbers. It is believed that this will continue unless the 
shortage of concentrates causes the slaughter of some pure-bred herds 
of pigs, which is unlikely. The physical condition of breeding animals 
seems to be healthy, although the animals are usually rather thin. 

Prices for all kinds of pure-bred animals are high — at least double 
pre-war quotations. Prices for pure-bred beef cattle and horses are 
higher than in the United States. It is an important indication of the 
confidence which British breeders have in the future of the pure-bred 
live stock business that by far the larger number of the pure-bred ani- 
mals in Great Britain are bought by British breeders for British herds 
and flocks. 



52 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO ASSIST THE BRITISH LIVE STOCK 

FARMER. 

Concentrates are today the greatest need of the British farmer. 
Manure being such an important necessity in his farming operations, 
the farmer who has no stock to feed or who has an insufficient supply 
of concentrates is in a very serious situation. The United States 
should furnish to Great Britain during the coming winter all the con- 
centrates, especially cottonseed cake, which shipping facilities will 
permit. Not only does a considerable part of the 1919 British grain 
production depend on this, but a much more vital necessity, the milk 
supply, depends for its maintenance to a great extent on an adequate 
supply of cottonseed cake. 

REQUIREMENTS AFTER THE WAR. 

The British farmer will continue to require large quantities of high 
protein cakes after the war and will be in the market for them. The 
British consuming public will be in our markets for as much beef and 
pork products as we can spare. 

The coming of peace will probably cause considerable demands for 
American horses, both for farm and city use, but this will be offset to 
some extent by the release of transport horses from the British army. 
It is an interesting fact to American farmers that the experience of the 
British army with grade Percheron horses from the United States 
has been extremely satisfactory, especially for transport and artillery 
purposes. It is believed that these horses have proved to be more 
hardy, more active and more courageous than the grades of other draft 
breeds. This fact is largely responsible for the growing interest in 
Percheron horses in England. Already some purchases have been made 
in France, and Percheron horses are found here and there throughout 
England. Just before the Commission left Great Britain a shipment 
of 2G mares and 1 stallion landed from Canada and are now in Norwich. 
A British Percheron Society has been organized, and I am confiden- 
tially informed that they propose to send a commission to the United 
States in 1919 to make purchases of Percherons in the United States 
for English breeders. The demand for commercial horses will probably 
develop as soon as it is known how many will be available by demobi- 
lization from the British army, as soon as shipping conditions become 
more normal, and as soon as feed supplies are available in Europe. 
In other words, we may look for this trade to manifest itself about 
July 1, 1919. 

On account of the sharp reduction in stocks of chickens there may 
be trade with American breeders. It may also be possible to arrange 
for the importation of pure-bred Holstein cattle from America, but it 



REPORT OP GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 5H 

will not be easy to bring about on account of the long-standing objec- 
tion to the importation of live cattle. 

With the foregoing possible exceptions, no restocking of British 
farms with live stock will be necessary, except perhaps in the case 
of pigs, which British breeders will be able to take care of without 
assistance. 

On the whole, British breeders will be competitors with American 
breeders in the world's markets for purebred live stock. They are 
already looking forward to the demand from continental Europe for 
animals to restock the devastated areas and to replenish herds else- 
where which have been depleted on account of the necessities of war. 

LIVE STOCK IN FRANCE. 

Purpose. — The French farmer is a consistent utilitarian. He grows 
live stock for certain very definite and practical purposes, the most 
primary motive being the money he can make out of them — either directly 
in sales or indirectly through the maintenance and increase in soil 
fertility. The breeds of live stock found in France are unquestionably 
useful and practical and on their native pastures they not only fit in 
admirably with farm practice, but they are extremely attractive as 
well. Few more beautiful sights can be offered the traveler interested 
in live-st'ock subjects than a group of Normandy cattle in a river-bound 
pasture, with a few choice Percheron colts grazing with them, or 
several teams of four or six white Charolais oxen in each, plowing in a. 
field at sunset. However, one does not get the impression of personal 
attachment between the man and his animal which is so strongly evi- 
dent in the case of the British farmer. The French peasant's great 
passion is the land, and four-fifths of them own the land they operate. 
Although there are many distinct breeds of live stock in France, which 
are bred to a type in rather well-defined areas, we do not find the 
extraordinary development of systematic breeding with elaborate 
pedigree records which is such a feature of animal breeding in Great 
Britain and also in the United States. 

Specifically we may assign two general purposes for live-stock raising 
in France : 

a. To consume roughage and supply a sufficient quantity of manure 
to keep up soil fertility. An American soldier remarked that in the 
French farming villages the social stat;is of the farmer was indicated 
by the size of the compost heap at his front door. Be that as it may, 
the compost heap is one of the most conspicuous features of a French 
rural home. The French farmer is nothing if not practical. For 
example, he has mitigated requisitioning of farm horses for military 
purposes largely by the substitution of oxen, and has been financially 



o4 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

the gainer in many cases. Oxen are slow, it is true, but they consume 
rough feed, they do not become so easily blemished as horses, the 
manure is more valuable from them, and when worn out they will bring 
more money for meat than will horses. 

T). To produce meat and milk for home and city consumption. Meat 
does not form nearly so large a proportion of the diet in France as in 
Great Britain, and meat production is therefore not so highly special- 
ized. With the skillful cooking which is a national trait, wonderful 
things can be done with an unpromising piece of meat. For this 
reason careful feeding is not so necessary when a French cook prepares 
the meat. More veal is used and meat animals generally are fed out 
at much younger ages than across the channel. This is particularly 
true with cattle. Big calves, which are neither veals nor baby beef, 
are common. Breeding stock is kept at the highest possible maximum 
and young animals are sent to market early, with their weight obtained 
from the dam's milk and green forage. 

Highly specialized dairy breeds do not seem to be common in France. 
Even the red Flemish cattle of the northeast are praised for their 
meat as well as for their milk. Cows apparently must be capable of 
fattening when closed out of the dairy and a calf not wanted for 
breeding must go to the block as veal or into the fields for work. 

Except for Percheron horses, the purebred live-stock business is a 
relatively unimportant feature of French farming and has not figured 
extensively in the foreign trade. 

The Condition of French Herds During the War (Numbers). 



Class. 


1913 
Dec. 31. 


1914 
Dec. 31. 


1915 
June 30. 


1916 
June 30. 


1917 
June 30. 


Cattle: 

Bulls 


284,190 
1,843,160 
7.794,270 

2,853,650 

2,012,440 


231,(53 
1,394,384 
6,663,355 

2,549,417 

1,829,434 


211,343 
1,262,315 
6,346,496 

2,581.870 

1,884.825 


221,300 
1,321,887 
6,337,799 

2,678,837 

2,032,102 


214 764 


Steers 


1 295 120 


Cows 


6 238.690 


"Breeders" (over 1 


2 677 870 


"Breeders" (under 1 


2,016,860 






Total cattle 


14,787,710 

293,640 
9,288,460 
2„580,810 
3.968,480 


12,668,243 

258,447 
8,390,863 
1,881.295 
3,507,756 


12,286,849 

239,832 
8,033.886 
1.572,236 
3.637,235 


12,723,946 

209,760 
7,143,685 
1,288,250 
2.654,680 


12,443,304 

188,204 
6,463,720 
1,129,320 
2,795,350 


Sheep: 

Rams over 1 year 

■ Ewes over 1 year 

Wethers over 1 year . . . 






Total sheep 


16,131.390 

38,560 

906,790 

2.800.760 

3.289,740 


14,038,361 

• 36,179 

802,858 

2,226.456 

2,859,994 


13,483.189 

31,501 

785.989 

1,632,252 

3,041,054 


10,845,280 

27,631 

660,631 

1,317.432 

2,442,404 


10 586 594 


Pigs: 


26,090 


Sows 

Pores a L'Engrrais o . . . 
Pigs under 6 months. . . 


628,040 
1.300,840 
2,245,310 


Total pigs 


7,035,850 
3,231,000 


5,925,487 
2.105,000 


5,490,796 
62,156,000 


4,448,366 
62.246.000 


4,200,280 
2,283,000 







a Pigs for fattening. 
6 For December 31. 



REPORT OP GEORGE M. ROMMEL. i)0 

Ten departments in France have been occupied by the enemy more 
or less completely since the invasion of 1914, The French authorities 
estimate that the decline in animals in those districts has been, of 
cattle 935,954, and of sheep 824,652. The period is from December, 
1913, to December, 1914. Some of the animals were moved into other 
sections of the country and presumably appear in statistics for those 
departments. The French assume that the live stock in territory 
Avholly and continually occupied by the Germans are entirely lost to 
France. In departments only partially occupied no increase can be 
expected so long as the war is in progress. 

The iigures given above show that the most serious losses have oc- 
curred among sheep; that pigs have suffered less seriously, and that, 
under the circumstances, cattle are holding their own surprisingly well. 

a. Cattle have declined in numbers about two and one-tliird millions 
since December 31, 1913. However, since the first shock of the invasion 
there has not been an alarming decrease in numbers — only 1.8 per cent. 
Furthermore, there are now reported more young cattle under one 
year of age than before the war. We were told that in certain sections 
of central France cattle were increasing in numbers. These facts are 
very encouraging, and if the slaughter of young stock can be prevented 
during next winter and spring a rather serious crisis will have been 
passed. 

During the summer and early fall the demands of the military opera- 
tions made it impossible to obtain cars to ship cattle to Paris. Many 
were therefore driven to market on foot for long distances. At the 
time of our departure from France the transportation problem was 
somewhat easier and cattle were coming in freely both by the roads 
and by rail. The relief of the rail congestion had the usual effect. 
In addition, France faces a feed situation more serious than exists 
in Great Britain. Not only has a considerable proportion of her pro- 
ducing area been occupied by the contending armies, but the horses 
for these armies required relatively larger quantities of French feed 
stuffs, especially roughage. The number of cattle being received at 
the Villette market in Paris in mid-October was said to be larger than 
before the war. There were a few bulls, the rest being cows and 
jiteers in equal proportion. The market could not absorb them at the 
fixed official prices, and the absence of sufficient cold-storage accom- 
modations made the situation difficult. The opinion was freely ex- 
pressed that after the supply now going to market is exhausted there 
will be a growing scarcity of native veal and beef, which will become 
acute during the winter and spring months. The inevitable high 
prices for live animals which will result will tempt farmers to sell 
their young stock, and in the opinion of leading agricultural authori- 
ties this can only be averted by the importation of frozen beef. 



56 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

The dairy situation in France has been fairly well maintained^ 
although dairy products are high in price, butter and cheese especially. 
Like Great Britain, France will need concentrates, especially oil cakes, 
during the winter. Her own supplies of oil cakes have been seriously 
reduced on account of her not receiving oil seeds in the usual quantity 
for manufacture. France grows much more alfalfa and other legumes 
than Great Britain, but the reduction in her home manufactured oil 
cakes largely tends to offset this. 

h. The decline in sheep production in France has been serious. The 
invasion, the labor shortage and the high prices for live animals 
have all combined to cause a reduction in the flocks of approximately 
30 per cent. A still further reduction was taking place when we left. 
The receipts of sheep at the Villette market in Paris were said to be 
as large as before the war. 

c. Pigs in France, while reduced in numbers, are not causing the 
authorities serious concern. Sufficient supplies of breeding stock will 
probably remain in any event to permit fairly rapid replacement after 
the war. 

d. The horse supply on farms is below present requirements, but 
farmers have replaced horses with oxen, so that there has not been a 
material decline in production on this account. It must be remembered 
that oxen have always been used for farm work in France. When 
need arises, therefore, the farmer is able to supplant his horses by oxen 
without having to familiarize himself with a form of motive power 
of which he is ignorant. The relatively large number of oxen in the 
country made it possible for French farmers to meet the heavy demands 
of the war for horses in a fairly satisfactory manner. In some cases 
both the supply of horses and of oxen is reduced to the minimum. 
One farmer, operating north of Paris, said that in normal times he 
used 25 horses on his farm. The army had taken five this year and if 
further requisitions were made he would have to cut down his tillage 
area. On the other hand, in the Gironde, where the replacement of 
horses on farms by oxen was general, we were told that there Avere 
still some horses to be spared. The French Government requisitioned 
135,000 horses last spring, mainly for the American army, and that 
army needs still more horses. The supply of horses for the American 
army, however, is a military question which is not directly germane 
to this report. 

So far as this question affects the maintenance of production on 
French farms, it may be said that further heavy requisitions on French 
farmers are not possible without causing a decrease in the agricul- 
tural output and therefore indirectly tending to reduce the morale 
of the French people. Looking to the future, we may expect that large 
numbers of the horses now in both the French and American armies 



REPORT OP GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 57 

will be made available for the French farmers. It must be said, 
however, that the horses of neither army are maintained so well as in 
the British army. There will therefore probably be a smaller propor- 
tion of fit horses available when demobilization begins. 

Horses in civilian duty in France show the effects of the shortened 
feed supply and will have a rather rough time of it next winter. 

The price of horses in France is about the same as in Enghand, and 
the increase since the war has been in about the same ratio. Good 
geldings are worth |1,000 to |1,200. The horses bought in France for 
the American army are said to have cost around |700 each. At a 
Percheron stud which we visited stallions were priced at |2,000 to 
^3,000. Weanling Percherons are worth $600 to |800 each. 

e. Poultry are scarce in France and very high priced. Of all classes 
of poultry on the markets, geese seemed cheapest. Chickens sell in 
Paris at about |1.00 per pound, geese at GO to 70 cents per pound. 
Flocks of poultry are seen around the barn yards but rarely in fields. 
Colony houses on range are seldom seen. High prices and strong de- 
mand have combined to bring about what appears to be a considerable 
decline in the number of poultry. 

WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO ASSIST THE FRENCH FARMER 
IN LIVE-STOCK PRODUCTION. 

a. The greatest problem of the French farmer for the immediate 
future is to prevent the slaughter of the large supplies of young cattle 
which are now on hand. Not only does the meat and milk production 
for the next two years depend to a great extent on the successful 
solution of this problem, but an even larger problem, the restoration 
of the cattle industry in the devastated areas, is linked up with it. 
Some authorities believe that if the slaughter of young cattle can be 
prevented, France will have in ten years more cattle than ever before. 
An ample supply of chilled or frozen beef will probably prevent this 
slaughter. Reference is made above to the expected shortage of beef 
during, the winter and spring of 1918-19. If this shortage can be made 
up by importations from America, the solution of the problem may 
be found. There is a possibility of failure in the fact that French 
people do not like refrigerated beef. They usually eat meat quite fresh, 
often with some of the animal heat still remaining in it at the time of 
cooking. Experimental shipments at reasonable prices should soon 
establish whether this measure of relief could be made a success. 

6. Feed supplies are low in France and importations in large 
quantity will be urgently needed during next winter and spring. It 
has been pointed out by another member of the Commission that 
France has been deprived of considerable quantities of cottonseed 



58 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

and other oil cakes which were formerly manufactured at Mediter- 
ranean ports, but which have not been available during recent years 
of the war. 

c. In regard to live stock, the needs of France after the war are 
best indicated by the losses which she has sustained, particularly in 
the devastated area. Roughly, there has been a loss of 900,000 cattle 
und 800,000 sheep in the departments which have been invaded. 
0£Qcials of the Government estimate that of these numbers 400,000 
were dairy cows and 400,000 were breeding ewes. What losses there 
were in pigs no official figures indicate. The loss in horses is repre- 
sented mainly by the numbers which went into the army and were lost 
in warfare. An estimate that there are 30 per cent less horses on 
French farms to-day than before the war is probably not far wrong. 

Authorities differ as to the relative importance in which animal re- 
construction should be taken up. Some place dairy cows first, others 
horses; some believe that the stocks now on hand will enable the 
reconstruction work to be carried on without supplies from elsewhere; 
others believe that tractors will fill the need caused by the shortage of 
horses. All agree that sheep are badly needed. 

So far as dairy cattle are concerned, the Government has already 
in contemplation making an experimental shipment from the United 
States, as has been already reported by cable and letter. It is proposed 
to buy 100 cows and place 10 in each one of the ten departments 
which have been invaded. Wherever Holsteins have been tried in 
France they are said to have given satisfaction. Certainly they should 
be given a trial in Flanders. The results of this shipment will be valu- 
able as indicating how far the United States will be called on for 
assistance in this regard. 

In view of the rather strong indications of the development of a 
demand for considerable numbers of dairy cattle from the United 
States, I took the liberty while in Paris, with the approval of the 
Chairman of the Commission, to exchange notes with the head of 
the French Live Stock Sanitary Service, suggesting an informal under- 
standing with the Bureau of Animal Industry on the subject ©f cattle 
importations. This correspondence is being forwarded direct to the 
Chief of the Bureau. The attitude of the French official is encouraging 
and the correspondence can be made the basis of more formal negotia- 
tions if desired. 

With horses and mules it is to be expected that one of the first 
sources of supply will be those now in the French and American 
armies. Naturally the British horses first relieved will go to British 
farmers. The American armies can do French farmers a service 
if they are allowed to buy horses and mules, especially the heavier 
ones, as rapidly as demobilization will permit. There will be no object 



REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 59 

whatever in bringing all the American army animals home. If the 
American army does not need them in France, the French and Belgian 
farmers should be allowed to have them. Arrangements should and 
no doubt can be made to insure equitable prices for such animals. 
They should not be "condemned" and sold at auction. 

I am unable to see that the United States can offer French farmers 
any assistance in rebuilding the sheep industry. Possibly Argentina 
would be a more promising source of supply. 

d. There will in all probability be a considerable demand for poultry 
for the farmers of the invaded districts. The "Agricultural Relief 
of Allies Committee," an organization fostered by the Royal Agricul- 
tural Society of England, which has been donating live stock, poultry, 
seeds, and other agricultural materials to these people, finds a very 
large demand for poultry and has sent large numbers to France. A 
French official interested in reconstruction work stated that the first 
animals the returning farmer wanted was some chickens, a rabbit, and 
then a cow. The introduction of American breeds of chickens would 
probably have less prejudice to contend with than those of dairy 
cattle. 

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 

In the agricultural reconstruction work at the close of the war the 
farmer of Continental Europe should neither be given charity nor 
should he be made the victim of exploitation. Neither should the 
farmers of any other countries be allowed to suffer from the conse- 
quences of unbalanced production, from inadequate distribution, or 
from unwise financial organization. 

This general statement leads to the suggestion that agricultural 
matters in the future will receive much larger consideration in inter- 
national councils than has heretofore been the rule. American busi- 
ness men on war duty in London and Paris, almost without exception, 
recognize the importance of agricultural matters in world affairs and 
at the same time admit their inability to handle them on account of 
t^eir lack of technical knowledge. An officer of the United States 
Food Administration in London stated that he had declined invitations 
to confer with officers of the British Ministry of Agriculture on certain 
subjects because he felt himself lacking in technical knowledge and 
there were no representatives of the Department of Agriculture in 
London on whom he could call. 

After the first need is met, after starving, shivering peoples are fed 
and clothed, crop growing is restored, and live stock herds are replen- 
ished, the great problem to be considered is the development of the 
world's agriculture in order to prevent unbalanced production. No 
one will predict at this time how the American farmer should prepare 



60 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

for the 1920 wheat harvest, because no one knows what the consuming 
nations of the world are likely to need or what other producing nations 
are likely to do. Neither can anyone offer any predictions as to the 
American program for meat or wool production in 1925. Why should 
farmers everywhere rush into the production of such a staple as 
wheat if on investigation a conservative planting program will satisfy 
all reasonable demands and provide for unforeseen contingencies? The 
United States suffered from unbalanced production for thirty years 
after the Civil War. The rapid development of farming in the upper 
Mississippi Valley and westward is a splendid theme for a platform 
orator to use to thrill his audience. Practically, however, it wrecked 
for a generation the agriculture of the North Atlantic States; it 
stopped the growing of wheat in England and in the very land where 
this development took place ''a farmer" in the nineties was a by-word 
for an unwise, short-sighted individual. In Iowa at this time the 
bright boys in the farm family were the favored ones and, if the 
father could afford it, received an education to fit them for a profes- 
sion or for business. The dullards, who were not worth an education 
in the father's opinion, were left to manage the farm. In those days 
corn was burned for fuel in Nebraska and Iowa farmers welcomed an 
epidemic of hog cholera because the ravages of the disease sent the 
market up. The land was not to blame, nor the weather, nor the 
Government. This calamitous condition was the result of unbalanced 
agricultural production ; more grain and meat were produced than 
the world's markets could absorb. 

For the protection of the American farmer and in justice to the 
farmers of other countries, nothing should be left undone which 
humanly can be done to prevent such an unwise development as a sequel 
to the present war. Fortunately, in the Agricultural Extension Act, 
and the various services organized under it, American farmers have 
functions at their command which may fairly be expected to protect 
them in any probable developments of world-wide agricultural condi- 
tions, provided full and accurate information is at the command 
of the United States Department of Agriculture. This information 
can not be forthcoming unless the United States Government can an- 
swer two questions: (1) What are the prospective food, feed and 
•iber demands of the world? (2) What are the prospective produc- 
tion possibilities of the agricultural countries? If the Department of 
Agriculture can forecast the answer to these questions with reason- 
able accuracy sufficiently in advance of the production of a given crop, 
the county agents can furnish our farmers with information which 
will enable them to expand or contract their operations to conform to 
world requirements. The success of the production campaigns of the 
Department undertaken during the war in the light of fairly accurate 



REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 61 

knowledge of world conditions is suggestive of what may be done under 
f^eace conditions with the more accurate information which peace will 
make available. I therefore venture the opinion that production pro- 
grams will be desirable in the United States after the war. They will 
be necessary for the protection of the American farmer and they will 
have to be based on information which can only be obtained through 
agents of the Department in European capitals such as London and 
Paris. Thereby will the American farmer's interests be safeguarded. 

Will this be all ? Already the American papers are running accounts 
of the food distress among the people of Austria-Hungary and Bul- 
garia, and the statement is made that the food shipment program may 
have to be increased 5,000,000 tons over the first arrangement in 
order to meet the unexpected food developments caused by tlie x4.ustrian 
collapse. Hints are even thrown out that Americans may even be 
called upon to meet one of the supreme tests of a true Christian — 
to share their food with those who have heretofore been enemies. 

One of the young Americans just out of Kussia says that Bolshevism 
is spreading throughout the Austrian territories and Turkey and that 
the best cure for it is food. A leather expert in touch with Eussian 
conditions says that next to food the Russian people will need shoes 
next winter more than anything else. What an appeal these facts 
will make to the generosity of the American farmer ! How they could 
be used to fire him to sturdy efforts to grow more than America needs ! 
But what of the wheat and wool in Australia, the production possibili- 
ties of Russia herself, of Roumania and France? Suppose the Aus- 
tralian wheat were a surplus. What could such a surplus not do to 
the price of American 'wheat if suddenly thrown on the market? Let 
us answer these questions by saying that the American farmer should 
not be permitted to let generous motives get the better of his sound busi- 
ness judgment. However, Russia may have to be the world's ward for 
some time to come. If so, the rest of the Avorld has to supply her with 
food for a year or two, and to supply Austria and possibly Germany 
even, common sense and foresight seem to urge that as soon as possible 
the associated nations draw plans accordingly to meet the world 
emergency. It is not too much to believe that the nations now asso- 
ciated as belligerents will be compelled to have some sort of under- 
standing as to their agricultural production, not only for self-protec- 
tion, but to fulfill the obligations which they will have towards the 
people of the defeated nations, and which, for humanity's sake, they 
can not evade. 

Let us pass over the question of the distribution of food, feed, and 
fibers with the assumption that both on sea and land means will be 
found to move those products from the producer to the consumer. 



€2 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

There is another aspect of this subject which compels attention to 
agricultural production as an international world-wide problem. The 
financial problems after the war will be enormous. True, we Americans 
do not have to fear the consequences of a bad banking system which 
caused such havoc in the United States after the Civil AVar. The 
United States has a safeguard in a banking system which has stood 
the strain of the war splendidly. The war as a whole may not have 
been scientifically financed, but, in the light of the information avail- 
able, the work has been wonderfully well done. When peace comes 
and the ledger is cast up, the world will learn where it stands. It 
will know what interest charges must be met, what sinking funds must 
be created, what retrenchments made — in fact, the world will then 
find out that it is financially poor but sound in mind and heart. The 
job then will be to get to work, meet the interest, create the sinking 
funds, make the retrenchments, and strive with might and main to 
create wealth to replace as far as possible that which has been 
destroyed. It is inconceivable in the first place that such a stupendous 
financial task can be performed without cooperation among the leaders 
of the nations now associated as belligerents, and in the second place 
it is equally inconceivable that the possibilities of agriculture as a 
source for the rapid creation of wealth could by any chance be over- 
looked. 

Let us consider the relationship of agriculture to war finance in 
the light of a famous national experiment. As a war measure Great 
Britain has made a great efl'ort to increase wheat production. As such 
it is justifiable and the British farmers as a class have loyally cooper- 
ated with the government to make the plan succeed. Under the stimu- 
lus of a high market price as a guarantee to farmers, the compulsion 
of law as to plantings and an elaborate organization for administra- 
tion several million acres of grass land were plowed up and possibly 
half of Great Britain's wheat requirement was this year grown at 
home. I believe it was Disraeli who once referred to the British as 
the most emotional nation in Europe. The success of their wheat 
campaign has fired many leading British agriculturists with the idea 
That it is possible to grow all the wheat needed in the United King- 
dom. If wheat, why not all necessary staples, and the fetish "agricul- 
tural self-sufficiency" comes into being. The Government, through the 
Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Prothero, and one of his chief assistants, 
Sir Daniel Hall, are committed to this policy even if (in Sir Daniel's 
opinion) state ownership of land becomes necessary. Aside from the 
natural preference of British farmers for grass farming and live stock 
production and the economy of wheat production in the British colonial 
dominions, the expense to 'the British taxpayer for the subsidies the 
British farmer now receives for wheat growing is somewhere around a 



REPORT OP GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 63 

million dollars a day. In France, even, where wheat growing was 
always important and supplied in peace times most of the nation's 
requirements, a member of this Commission has estimated the cost 
of the bread subsidy at two hundred and forty million dollars annu- 
ally. With the cheaper wheat of Canada, Australia, India, and South 
America available, such a condition becomes intolerable, because it 
.subjects the non-agricultural classes to a burden of taxation which 
they will be the first to resent. After-the-war financing will not stand 
such an expense item and sound economy will demand its elimination. 
This subject and others like it (wool supplies, for example) should 
not be handled without expert agricultural advice and participation 
at the council table. The subject of agriculture can not escape con- 
sideration in business management of inter-allied affairs after peace 
is declared, and it should be handled by qualified authorities and not 
by men who, well meaning though they may be, are frequently 
amateurs. 



64 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. 



THE AGRICULTURAL NEEDS OF THE ALLIES DURING 1920. 
FRENCH REQUIREMENTS. 

War or no war, it seems probable that France will need in 1920,. 
and perhaps for one or two years thereafter, to import wheat, frozen 
meat, wool, farm machinery, and commercial fertilizers in greater 
quantity than before the war. This is the general consensus of 
opinion among French authorities themselves. There follows, in brief 
summary, some of the evidence collected in support of this statement. 

WHEAT. 

The estimated wheat production for 1918 is Qy^ million metric tons. 
For reasons stated elsewhere there may be not more than 5 million 
tons raised in 1919. The requirement for 1918 has been placed at 
7,175,000 metric tons, including 900,000 tons for seed. This is based 
upon bread made by the substitution of 20 per cent of other cereals. 
If the requirement for 1920 is based on white bread, 7.8 million 
metric tons of wheat will be required for human consumption. To 
this must be added the seed requirement, 900,000 metric tons, making 
a total of 8.7 million tons, of which France may be expected to 
produce 5 million. This leaves 3.7 million metric tons, or 137 million 
bushels, to be imported in 1920. 

BARLEY. 

Wheat, says the French expert, should be favored in place of barley. 
From an importation standpoint barley is chiefly interesting as a 
wheat substitute. Last year it was necessary to use barley as a 
diluent of wheat flour. Hence there was not enough home-grown 
barley for brewing. Furthermore, there had been but little carry-over 
the previous year. In case of peace, France will go back to wheat 
bread, and will be less interested in barley, since then its own pro- 
duction of barley will more nearly supply its demand. From the 
standpoint of importation wheat is important also because it takes 
less space than an equal value of barley and because it has a higher 
milling quality. 

FROZEN MEAT. 

The total number of cattle in France has decreased considerably, 
perhaps 15 to 20 per cent. About half of this decrease was due to 
loss of occupied territory. The number of calves, however, is normal, 



REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. 65 

-or even above that of pre-war times. Hence the percentage of loss 
of mature animals is much greater. In order that the cattle supply 
of France recuperate quickly, the farmers should hold back from 
market their young stock, and frozen meat should be imported while 
these young animals are becoming mature. Whether this will occur 
depends, of course, on relative prices. It would seem probable that 
the demand among the farmers themselves, for live animals, in order 
to consume the pastures and forage, would help to keep their animals 
from coming to market, and thus induce the importation of beef if 
prices do not rule too high. 

WOOL. 

The reasons for it will be discussed elsewhere, but the fact is that 
there has been a marked decrease — it may almoi^t be said an extraor- 
dinary' as well as unwise decrease— in the number of sheep during 
the war. By 1915 the number had decreased 40 per cent. Since then 
there have probably been further decreases. This not only lessens 
the meat supply, but also lowers the future output of wool. There 
is a general consensus of opinion that it will take fibers, especially 
wool and cotton, longer to catch up with the world's needs than it 
will the food supplies. France, England, and Germany are all likely 
to be in the world's market for some years to come, with insistent 
demands for fibers, which may have an important bearing upon the 
agriculture of the United States during the nest decade. The signi- 
ficance of this remark will be discussed later. 

FARM MACHINERY. 

It is more or less short lived. Hence there has been not only a 
considerable loss in the damaged area, but there has been a decrease 
through normal use in the free portions of France. The shortage 
of manpower has also caused a greater interest in labor-saving machin- 
ery. These and other factors seem to make it certain that there will 
be an increased demand for farm machinery, using the term in a 
broad way. For example, there is a marked deficiency at the present 
time of carts and wagons. Ammunition factories, it is believed by 
some, will later turn their attention to the production of farm machin- 
ery, including tractors, thus making extensive importations unneces- 
sary. Others say that the French do not show a genius for the con- 
struction of farm machinery and will not be able to compete with 
American firms who already more or less fully occupy the field. How- 
ever that may be, it seems that there will be a considerable demand 
for American farm machinery, at least during the transition or the 
attempted transition stage, as the case may be, provided American 



Gii REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

factories are themselves in a position to supply the orders. Since the 
manufacturers of farm machinery are competently represented in 
Europe it may be doubted whether any suggestions by this Com- 
mission can bi- serviceable. 

COMMERCIAL FERTILIZERS. 

The one requirement of French agriculture upon which the French 
authorities are agreed is the need of commercial fertilizers. So em- 
phatic is this feeling that they say one boat bringing phosphates from 
Africa will be as effective as fifteen boats in bringing food from 
America. France is also short of nitrogenous feeding stuffs, through 
the breakdown of her oil factories during the war. It has been neces- 
sary for Great Britain to allot sulphate of ammonia to France which 
she very much needed on her own farms. 

TRANSPORTATION. 

Over and above these direct agricultural requirements France needs^ 
freight cars. Lack of transportation helps to aggravate the shortage 
of food. Thus, for example, while there is a general shortage of pota- 
toes in France, the situation is made much more difficult because in 
some places there is an over-supply while in others there is a great 
shortage. The greater demand for freight cars for moving soldiers 
and munitions makes it impossible to move potatoes from one point 
to the other. This applies more or less to all classes of staple foods. 
The shortage of wheat is made greater by the lack of transportatioiL 
between Algiers and France. Hay is selling in Paris at |80 per ton, 
retail, while within fifty miles there are farmers who are having 
diflSculty in making satisfactory disposition of their product. 

BRITISH REQUIREMENTS. 

A study of the 1920 and future needs of the United Kingdom is- 
made somewhat difficult by the attitude of mind of the British men. 
of affairs. It is to be the settled policy of the United Kingdom to 
get its raw materials from its outlying possessions, and in return tO' 
insist upon these colonies buying their manufactured materials from, 
the home country. It is a part of the policy to keep London the great 
financial center of the world. Of course, even in pre-war times, there 
has always been the assumption, more or less fully understood, that 
this would be done. • Now it is a definite and avowed policy, which 
Premier Hughes of Australia states as "trade first with our overseas 
dominion, next with our allies, next with the neutrals, and next 
or not at all with our enemies." When, therefore, one talks to a: 



REPORT OP THOMAS F. HUNT. 67 

Britisher about the future needs of the United Kingdom, his mind 
instinctively considers not so much the needs of the United Kingdom 
as the supplies which their own possessions may be able to furnish. 
The primary object of the Commission was to determine the probable 
future needs of our allies without reference to the source of supply, 
and then secondly, how much- of this need the United States should 
undertake to supply, and particularly, whether there was any obliga- 
tion upon the farmers of the United States to change their agricul- 
tural policy to meet these future demands. 

SEVEN STAPLE REQUIREMENTS. 

Various authorities discussed the following as probably needed by 
the United Kingdom in 1920 in greater quantity than in pre-war 
times, namely, (1) wheat, (2) meat, particularly frozen beef, (3) 
sugar, (4) coffee, (5) feeding stuffs, (6) wool, and (7) cotton. 

WHEAT. 

All observers insist upon wheat as the cheapest and most concen- 
trated import food. It has a higher nutritive value for the money 
required. It contains a large amount of food for the shipping space 
occupied. It has a high milling quality, and the offal has high feeding 
value. These milling offals are and will be much in demand. Some 
authorities state the rate of extraction as 85 per cent, while other 
equally good authorities say that 88 per cent is taken in domestic 
wheat and 91 per cent in the best imported hard wheat. The best 
extraction of barley is 68 per cent, while the present Government re- 
quirement is 50 per cent. The lower the extraction the better the 
flour and the more offal obtained for domestic animals, which just at 
the moment is a consideration of considerable importance. For the 
best grades of patent white wheat flour the extraction it was agreed 
should be 72 per cent. 

GRASS. 

There is a rather general but not unanimous agreement that the 
increased acreage of plowed land will not obtain permanently. The 
climate is better adapted to grass than to cereals. The British are 
willing to pay a higher price for their own meat products than for 
the imported article. Imported beef, however, is sometimes sold as 
prime British beef. Our American mutton is, confessedly, below 
the British quality. The bacon, with its excessive fat and its hard salt 
cure, which is now being shipped from the United States is distinctly 
inferior to the American bacon used for home consumption. It is also 



CS REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

pointed out that most of the flour milling is now done at seaports, 
hence these mills can buy to advantage imported wheat. It is the 
interior mills which grind the domestic wheat chiefly. They are 
generally decreasing, both in number and size, because of this seaport 
competition. The factor that does most to keep them going is the 
bran, which in addition to being nearer the point of consumption is 
claimed to be of better quality for feeding purposes. How much of 
this claim was justified was not determined. 

LATE SEASON. 

According to observations, as well as statements made, the seison 
has been late. The large crop of wheat has been rather badly damaged 
by persistent rains. The loss has been variously estimated at from 
5 to 25 per cent, the first figure probably being nearer the truth. A 
representative of the leading milling company which is now grinding 
the present domestic crop, says that it is the poorest in quality in 
the history of the country. Since little wheat is yet sown, it seems 
not improbable that there might be a decrease in the acreage of the 
1919 crop. It is claimed, however, by more than one British commen- 
tator that there is still plenty of time (October 29th) to plow and 
seed wheat. If it is sown by December first, say these observers, all 
will be well, although it is admitted that October seeding is preferred. 
It is stated also that last year a considerable portion of the newly 
broken sod was sown to oats. This year that land will go into wheat. 
Hence the acreage of the latter may be further increased. At least 
one member of the Commission believes that the acreage of wheat will 
be less in 1918-19 than in 1917-18 in the United Kingdom. 

SUBMARINES. 

On account of the submarine warfare, drastic measures were taken 
to cause the plowing up of grass land and the seeding to cereals and 
other food crops. In 1917 the total area in England and Wales in 
grass, including clover and rotation grasses, was 18,334,370 acres. 
The preliminary statement for 1918 shows a decrease of grass land of 
1,650,690 acres, or 9 per cent. Likewise in 1917 the area in cereals 
was 5,693,200 acres, and in 1918, 7,080,380 acres, or an increase of 
1,387,180 acres, which is an increase of 24 per cent. Beans increased 
19 per cent and peas 15 per cent. Potatoes increased from 507,990 to 
633,840 acres, or 25 per cent. Flax increased from 2,510 to 18,400 
acres, or more than six times. The acreage in wheat increased 33 per 
cent: oats, which exceed wheat in total acreage, 23 per cent, and 
barley 3 per cent. The acreage of all human foods increased, while 
the acreage of all crops for domestic animals remained about station- 



REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. 69 

ary or decreased in the United Kingdom, with the exception of oats, 
which are now extensively nsed for human food. The requisitioning 
of food ordinarily used for live stock has produced a marked domestic 
shortage of concentrates and of hay. Pigs and chickens are being 
sacrificed because of this situation, and a marked increase in the price 
of milk has been allowed. Thus the winter wholesale price of milk 
has been set at |5.40 per cwt. f. o. b. farmer's railway station. This 
price is between three and four times any pre-war prices existing 
since at least 1880. The estimated yield of wheat in the whole United 
Kingdom is the largest since 1878. The average pre-war yield for 
the two years prior to the war, together with the production for each 
of the following years, is shown below: 

Average. Million Bushels. 

1912-13 57.04 

1913-14 62.52 

1914-15 73.12 

1915-16 59.77 

1916-17 64.32 

1917-18 1 93.20 

1 Estimated. 

Not since 1885 has the yield of wheat exceeded 80 million bushels 
until this year. 

RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE WAR UPON THE AGRICULTURE OF THE TWO 

COUNTRIES. 

It is interesting to note the comparative trend of wheat production 
in the United Kingdom and Prance, not alone because of its bearing 
upon the supply of wheat, but because it indicates in a considerable 
degree the relative vicissitudes of agriculture in the two countries. 
Remembering that the average production of wheat for the two years 
1912 and 1913 was, in the United Kingdom, less than 60 million 
bushels, and in France, about 330 millions, and taking these yields at 
100, the percentage production during the war period compared to 
the pre-war production stands as folloAvs : 

United Kingdom. France. 

1912-13 100 100 

1913-14 110 86 

1914-15 130 68 

1915-16 105 63 

1916-17 113 44 

1917-18 163 73 

Statistical data must not be taken too literally, even Avhen one is 
certain of its accuracy; yet after rather unusual opportunity to observe 
the conditions in the two countries, we believe that these two columns 
do not unjustly represent in general the status of agriculture during 
the war in these two countries. England, for example, is disturbed be- 



70 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

cause the number of sheep has decreased 4 per cent. Her authorities 
are quite properly making every effort to increase her flocks. France, 
however, during the first two years of war, lost not 4 per cent but 40 
per cent of her sheep. Assuming the population of the United King- 
dom to be 48 millions, and that of France 40 millions, the per capita 
production of wheat is seen to be as follows: 

Production per capita in bushels. 

United Kingdom. France. 

1912-13 1.2 8.1 

1913-14 1.3 7.1 

1914-15 1.5 5.6 

1915-16 1.2 5.2 

1916-17 1.3 3.6 

1917-18 1.9 6.0 

In the United Kingdom the food situation has not been due to a 
decrease in food production, but to a fear that the submarine might 
prevent the normal importation. In France there has been a marked 
decrease in production, requiring large importations, when in peace 
times the country is nearly, or quite, self-contained. This fact made 
the British situation the more critical because part of the importa- 
tions which in peace times would have gone to England, as a matter 
of course had to be diverted to France. The British are not people 
who speak of their sacrifices; hence attention has not been called to 
this aspect of the situation. On the other hand, the British were by no 
means improvident. There was never a time, even in the darkest 
days, when they did not have at least three months' supply of wheat 
in sight. 

NORMAL WHEAT REQUIREMENTS. 

''The future demand for wheat," says Sir Daniel Hall, "will be about 
normal. Probably we shall go back to white bread, which will in- 
crease the present demand somewhat for wheat." The total importa- 
tion of wheat in the United Kingdom in 1917 (including flour, in 
equivalent of grain) was 207 million bushels, while the domestic pro- 
duction was 64 million, making 271 millions. This makes a total 
requirement, including seed, of 5.6 bushels per capita. It may be 
stated safely that the production of wheat in the United Kingdom 
will not fall below 60 million or rise above 90 million bushels during 
the next few years. 

SUBSTITUTES. 

These data are based upon a substitution of at least 20 per cent 
of other cereals in the bread. The United Kingdom finished govern- 
ment regulation flour must contain 20 per cent flour from permitted 



REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT, 71 

cereals, but when the miller uses English wheat a deduction is made, 
with an average of 15 per cent, and in some cases 10 per cent. The 
admixture depends on the district, the gluten of some wheat being 
stronger than others. Potato flour is permitted but not specified. If, 
therefore, the wheat requirement is increased to replace the substitutes 
now employed on the basis of 20 per cent, her annual importation 
should range between 245 million and 275 million bushels. Her pre- 
war importations averaged about 220 million bushels annually. 

SUBSIDIES. 

On the other hand, the consumption of bread may decrease since 
presumably its price as related to other food will increase after the 
war. If the estimates of the British and French Governments as to 
the cost of wheat subsidies are correct, the present price of bread in 
those two countries is about two- thirds of its actual cost. According 
to their estimates a pound of bread costs each of the governments be- 
tween 7c. and 8c., while it is sold to the consumer at 5c. a pound. It 
is scarcely to be supposed that the policy will continue of taxing the 
whole people in order to maintain a low price on a single food com- 
modity. Just how much influence the increased cost of bread may 
have on consumption it is impossible to predict, but a member of the 
interallied scientific food council expressed the belief that the ten- 
dency during war or other periods of food scarcity was for the con- 
sumption of bread to increase, because a greater nutritive value could 
be obtained for a given cost than from most other staple foods. There 
is a general consensus of opinion, at least in trade centers, that 
Europe will go back to white bread as quickly as possible after peace 
is declared. The United Kingdom and France may need, therefore, 
to import during the year 1920 from the crops of 1918-19 probably not 
less than 350 million nor more than 425 million bushels of wheat. 

ITALY AND BELGIUM. 

To this must be added the requirement of Italy and Belgium, Italy 
normally imports 50 million bushels of wheat annually. During the 
last year she imported 118 million bushels, while her requirement for 
the coming year is about 90 millions. Since her 1918 crop is estimated 
at 160 million, her total requirement, including seed, is about 250 
million bushels or 6.6 bushels per capita. As her 1918 crop is, like 
that of France, good for war conditions, it seems probable that she 
will import not less than 100 million bushels during 1920. 

Prior to the war, the net importation into Belgium was about 50 
million bushels annually. The total requirement of our allies, there- 
fore, during 1920, will probably be at least 500 million bushels. Prior 



i^ REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

to the war Russia and Roumania exported something over 200 million 
bushels annually. Judged by pre-war demands, Germany may need 
100 million bushels. It seems not unlikely, therefore, that Germany,. 
Austria and other Balkan countries, will absorb all the available 
exports of Russia and Roumania, leaving our allies dependent upon 
the Western Continent and Australia for their supplies. 

WORLD'S PRODUCTION OF WHEAT. 

It will not be without interest in this connection to study the world's 
production of wheat for the last 5 years in which data are available. 
The year 1915 is the last year in which data are sufficiently complete 
to make an estimate of a total production practicable. 



WorUVs production of ivJieat. 

[From data compiled by Buiieau of Crop Estimates, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 

in million bushels.] 



Continent. 


1911 


1912 


1913 


1914 


1915 


North America 


864 
170 
1,957 
425 
86 
107 


966 

197 

2,144 

421 

68 

81 


999 
216 
2,392 
415 
87 
100 


1,057 
136 

1,958 

358 

71 

112 


1,457 
192 


South America 


Europe 


2.024 
427 


Asia 


Africa 


92 


Australasia 


33 


Total 


3.611 


3,879 


4,209 


3,692 


4.225 





The weather is the greatest single factor of the food supply of the 
world. Sufficient attention has not been paid to this factor. No one 
would maintain that the conditions were favorable throughout the 
world for the production of wheat in 1915 from a standpoint of labor, 
and yet there was gathered the greatest harvest that has ever been 
obtained. This result was secured notwithstanding Australia had one 
of the most disastrous seasons in her history. North America produced 
in 1917 at least 550,000,000 bushels less wheat than in 1915, although 
without any doubt just as extensive effort was made to produce it. 
In other words, weather conditions caused a drop in production equal 
to over one-eighth of the total world's supply of wheat. No one can 
determine with any degree of accuracy how many years it will take 
to reach the normal balance of food supply, because no one knows 
what the weather is going to be. Two unusually abundant crops of 
wheat in succession might fill the granaries of the world. Three iean 
seasons may continue the food shortage for five years. The greatest 
dangers to be anticipated, however, are (1) difficulties of transporta- 
tion and trade, and (2) inability through disturbed conditions of 
individuals to employ their time to economic advantage. The former 
maj^ cause local shortages of food, the latter an inability to purchase it. 



REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. 



73 



Perhaps the most important evidence that meat will be in even 
greater demand after the war is that, without any material decrease 
in the domestic meat supplies of the United Kingdom, the nation has 
had to go on a very strict meat ration. Compared with the pre-war 
period, cows and heifers in Great Britain are in 1918, 16 per cent 
more numerous, while other cattle have increased 3 per cent. Sheep 
have decreased 9 per cent and hogs 27 per cent. From an importation 
standpoint the decrease in hogs is not especially significant, since the 
total number of pigs in relation to population is small. In Great 
Britain, for example, there is less than one pig to twenty persons, 
Avhile in the United States there is one to two persons. 

Number of cattle, sheep and swine in Great Britain during decade. 



Kind of stock. 



1903-13 



Cows and heifers 

Other cattle 

Total cattle 

Sheep 

Swine 



2,773 
4,259 
7,032 
26,041 
2,489 



2,924 
4,406 
7,330 
24,256 
2,281 



3,030 
4.379 
7,409 
23.338 
1,825 



Since cows and heifers have increased at the expense of other cattle, 
the number of meat animals has decreased relatively. The amount of 
prime beef and mutton has been somewhat decreased because of lack 
of concentrates and the poor crop of roots. This and other factors 
have brought upon the market at this season an over-abundance of 
cattle, some of which the Government has refused to accept. There 
enters into the problem indirectly a lessened supply of hay through 
decreased acreage and Government requisitions for the army. In 
general, therefore, it may be stated that it does not seem probable that 
the United Kingdom will increase greatly her domestic supplies of meat 
during the next two or three years. Since it seems reasonable that 
her consumption of meat, especially beef, will increase as soon as 
the ration card is withdrawn, her demand for chilled and frozen beef 
will be greater than at present. Sir Daniel Hall believes that a short- 
age of imported beef in 1919 will make a shortage of domestic beef 
in 1920. "Bacon," he says, "will not be available from Denmark and 
Holland immediately. In the meantime. Great Britain will be thrown 
npon America for her supply." The imports of meat into the United 
Kingdom in 1917 were as follows : 



74 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

Imports of Meat, 1917. 

Cwt. 

Beef 7,723,944 

Mutton 2,620,314 

Bacon 6,567,574 

Hams 1,180,166 

Other meats 1,481,504 

BREEDING ANIMALS. 

While there is apparently good reason to believe there will be, in 
both France and the United Kingdom, increased demand for chilled 
and frozen beef, for which carrying capacity should be provided, it 
does not seem probable that there is going to be any great opportunity 
or responsibility upon the part of the live-stock breeders of America 
to furnish Europe with breeding animals after the war. In Great 
Britain breeding stock has been kept up in anticipation of peace. 
The breeders of Great Britain are looking forward to an after-the-war 
trade, not only with the Continent, but with North and South America 
as well. Their business is in a most prosperous condition, sales during 
recent months being made at almost fabulous prices. 

HORSES. 

Some exception may be made with regard to horses. Good farm 
draft horses are bringing in France at present |1,000 to |1,200 each^ 
while high-class horses in England bring similar prices. Rather ordin- 
ary farm work hordes, in both England and France, bring from $500 
to |800 each. To what extent the return of the army horses of these 
two countries and the addition of the now somewhat depleted supply 
in the American army will satisfy the existing and future demands, is 
somewhat difficult to forecast. Some account must be taken of the 
enormous number of army motor lorries and other forms of motor 
transportation which will be available in Great Britain and France 
after the war. There are many factors which enter into the use of 
the latter, such as the cost of operation, the narrow and crooked streets 
in many of the cities and towns, and the general inertia of business 
methods. When all these are taken into consideration it would seem 
that as soon as tonnage is available horses will begin to move from 
America to Europe and that there will be some foreign demand for 
American horses until prices on the two continents become equalized. 

SHIPPING SPACE FOR BEEF. 

Perhaps the most immediate steps to be taken in connection with 
provisioning the people of Europe is to provide suitable shipping- 
space for frozen and chilled beef. The stocks of wheat in Europe are 



REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. 75 

ample for immediate needs and there should be no difficulty in re- 
plenishing these stocks from North and South America and Australia 
in ample time to meet all needs. Doubtless there will be some diffi- 
culties in local distribution. The distribution of meat and meat prod- 
ucts, which has become a world-wide problem, is one of fundamental 
and lasting importance to the American farmer. For example, the 
failure of our allies to secure abundant supplies of beef from the 
United States during the war has not been wholly due to a lack of 
transportation facilities between England and the United States. It 
has been partly due to favorable contracts which the British Govern- 
ment could make for beef from Argentina and which they were under 
obligations to continue. Looking into the future, a thorough study, 
with a view to further development of the slaughtering, preparation, 
and distribution of meat products should be made both in this country 
and abroad. For example, when the inquiry was made that since 
sufficient carrying capacity was not available for frozen and chilled 
beef, why canned meats were not shipped, the statement was made 
that the packers were not able to extend their operatioi^s in this 
direction sufficiently to meet this situation. 

SUGAR. 

There is one article of food which both France and England ration 
in common. It is sugar. France rations bread and sugar by means of 
food cards and these only. England rations beef, mutton, poultry, 
butter, margarine, lard, and sugar. Both also restrict the use of milk 
as a beverage. The people of both these countries would consume 
more sugar if they could get it. The shortage in supply is primarily 
due to the fact that Germany has destroyed much of the French pro- 
duction and her own is not available to the Allies. As stated else- 
where, a most important agricultural loss in the devastated areas of 
France is the sugar-beet culture. It is estimated that 80 per cent of 
the sugar-beet factories of France have been delstroyed, and that it 
will take two years after peace is declared before they can be rebuilt 
and operations resumed. Germany, on the other hand, will be ready 
to resume operations at once wherever they have ceased during the 
war. 

COFFEE. 

There are three great products in the world that have not changed 
in price materially during the war. They are, wheat in Australia, 
horses in North America, and coffee in Brazil. Lack of tonnage, or, 
more strictly, a greater need of tonnage for other commodities, is the 
answer in each case. As soon as peace is declared an increased move- 



76 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

ment of coffee may be anticipated. This may seem unimportant in 
North Ainerica, but it must be remembered that the coffee planter 
of Brazil uses many imported articles, including food supplies. Brazil 
must therefore decrease her imports unless she can export her coffee. 

FEEDING STUFFS. 

There is a most insistent demand for concentrated feeding stuffs 
on the part of Great Britain. For example, it is estimated that 
Great Britain needs 791,000 tons of milling offals and grain between 
October, 1918, and April, 1919, of which she has in sight 706,000 tons, 
or a shortage of 85,000 tons. Of oil cakes and meals she needs in 
addition during the same period 578,000 tons, of which she has in 
sight 425,000 tons, or a shortage of 153,000 tons. The total estimated 
shortage for the coming season is therefore about 18 per cent of the 
normal requirement. The total consumption of oil cakes in the United 
Kingdom given in long tons, (2,210 pounds) has been as follows: 

Oil cake? Cottonseed 

and meals, meal only. 

1913 1,378 733 

1914 1,264 702 

1915 1,426 617 

1916 1,213 462 

1917 845 311 

A live-stock authority said he felt the demand would swing back to 
cottonseed meal, notwithstanding the great development of the oil 
industry in Great Britain during the war. In general he thought that 
if free trade continues, things must go back into old lines because 
foreign countries can supply raw materials cheaper than Great 
Britain can produce them. 

WOOL. 

The same authority states that after the war fibers would be more 
quickly needed than food and would take longer to readjust. "Sup- 
plies of wool and cotton are now very low," he said. Sir Daniel 
Hall said, ''Wool will be short the world over, but Australia has large 
stocks which will move as soon as tonnage is available." He might also 
have mentioned Argentina. An expert, in a position to know the com- 
mercial supply and needs of the world, dictated the following state- 
ment : 

French, Italian, and Belgium stocks must be reestablished, and 
recent deficiency in consumption supplied. The stocks, which have 
accumulated on account of inability to ship to Germany, Austria, 
and Russia, will be available for this purpose. 



REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. 77 

Whether the world's demand for wool in 1920 would be greater 
than the supply, he would not venture to predict, but said that in his 
opinion not only the increased production of sheep could be wisely 
promoted, but also that farming was in general a safe venture during 
the years immediately to come. 

COTTON. 

The British as well as the French believe it will require longer for 
the world's supply of fibers, cotton, wool, and flax, to meet the demand 
than it will take the food supply to readjust itself. 

DECREASED STOCKS. 

The demand for cotton will be insistent, because in normal times it 
is customary to carry over from year to year greater stocks of cotton 
than of food. This carr3'-over by merchants tends normally to stablize 
prices, since stocks are accumulated duriny years of low prices and 
sold during seasons of high prices. During the war these stocks 
have been reduced. There will thus be a demand for stocks as well as 
current supplies. 

CURRENT DEFICIENCIES. 

There is reason to believe that there will be an increased demand for 
cotton goods, since some people at least have restricted purchase dur- 
ing the war and will need to replenish their supplies. This applies 
particularly to household furnishings. The damaged areas of France, 
Belgium, and Italy will be in special need of replenishing current 
deficiencies. There is every reason to believe that Germany and the 
other Central Powers will be in the market for large supplies of raw 
cotton. This will apply equally to Russia. If Russia is some time 
finding herself, this will only continue the increased demand to a 
later date. 

NEW USES. 

There was a great shortage of cotton, which war conditions has 
accentuated. Among the new demands may be mentioned decreased 
prosperity of the world's population, and the successful substitution 
of cotton as a cheaper raw material in place of wool, linen, and silk. 
Processes have been applied to the manufacture of cotton by which 
fine fabrics are brought within reach of all pocket-books. 

SUPPLY OF FLAX. 

Flax will probably rule high for many years. There will be a 
tendency to substitute cotton wherever possible. 



78 



REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



LONG-STAPLE COTTON. 



John A. Todd, Professor of Economics, University College, Notting- 
ham, divides the cotton (supply of the world into five grades, sum- 
marized as follows: 



Summary of World Cotton Supply, hy Grades. 



Grade quality. 


staple. 


Pre-war prices 
Oct. 7, 1914. 


World's crop. 


1. Best Sea Island 


Inches 
2 and over. 

11/2-1% 

1 -iy2 
%-m 

% up 


Cents per lb. 
25-37 
20-25 
13-21 
10-14 
7-12 


Bales. 

15,000 

502.000 

1,400,000 

17,165,000 

7,200,000 


2. Second-grade Sea Island and best Egyptian 

3. Egyptian and Staple American 


4. American 


5. Indian 





According to these figures a high-grade Egyptian cotton in peace 
times brought about twice that of American short-staple. There were 
about 400,000 bales of this high-grade cotton, while of second-grade 
Egyptian cotton there were 1,000,000 bales. The poorest of th!is 
second-grade sold for no more than the best grade of short-staple, 
while the best of it sold for about 50 per cent more. The question 
is, therefore, whether on account of the greatly increased cost of 
producing long-staple Egyptian cotton over the American short-staple, 
it would pay to raise Egyptian cotton, if when short-staple is 14 cents, 
Egyptian is only 21 cents. Unless Egyptian will sell for twice the 
price of short-staple it may be doubted whether it is an industry 
that could be safely promoted as a regional wide enterprise. The 
argument in favor of Egyptian cotton ruling relatively high for some 
years to come is based on (1) new uses, such as for automobile tires, 
(2) a restricted production of Sea Island cotton, due to the attacks 
of the boll weevil and other factors, and (3) the great reduction 
of cotton in Egypt from the pink boll weevil for which no remedy 
has yet been suggested, and on account of the waterlogging of the 
cotton fields of Egypt from over-irrigation. While there is evidence 
that these factors will operate to a greater or less degree, the fact 
remains that the price of long-staple cotton is more or less specula- 
tive. There is always a steady demand for short-staple cotton (between 
'% and 11/4 inches), but in the case of longer staple there is often 
considerable fluctuation in the market price. On the other hand, there 
is a large acreage capable of growing short-staple cotton, while the 
area adapted to the finer grades of cotton is much more limited. It is 
evident that if one is to undertake to raise an expensive crop like 
Egyptian cotton, the greatest care should be exercised in using seed 
of high quality and in taking all necessary precautions to keep the 
iseed from being mixed with varieties or strains of different quality. 



REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. 79 

POSSIBLE SHIFT IN AGRICULTURAL PROSPERITY. 

Statistical data, more or less accurate, may now be set aside and 
speculation indulged in as to the possible influence of this war, which 
has engaged some twenty countries and will require nearly, or quite, 
fifty treaties to close. What influence is it going to have on the 
material progress of American agriculture and upon the peoples of 
the several regions so aflected? There are many currents and eddies 
that go to make up the stream. The direction of progress is a com- 
position of forces. The exact effect of several human agencies can 
not generally be accurately appi'^aised. It is certain, however, that 
forces of a national and even an international character have been 
acting upon American agriculture in a way profoundly to affect great 
regional areas of this country. The prosperity of certain areas has 
been accelerated, of others retarded. The future can not be predicated 
because no person has the necessary knowledge of future events, and 
if he had, he might not be wise enough to assess their signiflcance accur- 
ately. It is not difficult to see, however, that if certain classes of 
farm commodities are in greater demand than others over a series of 
years, money will flow into those regions in greater quantities and 
affect the life and activities of the people of the region. For example, 
the railroad mileage will increase, public and private buildings will 
be erected, city and farm homes built, the comforts of life increased, 
and the education of the children promoted. The high prices may 
indeed be due to a relatively high cost of production, which may make 
profits no greater than formerly. If, however, more money flows into 
a region, more development will take place, which is another name 
for prosperity. And this prosperity will not be greatly affected be- 
cause labor gets too large a proportion of the money, which is only 
another definition of the lack of profit. To the man who is about to 
enter upon the business of farming, and to the Government which 
essays to lead in promoting agricultural policies, therein lies a problem 
which may tax the best minds. If certain types of agriculture 
are for a decade to receive a relatively larger prosperity than other 
agricultural industries, the children of every farm home in America 
will be directly or indirectly affected. These factors cause one to think 
in new terms and to make us conscious that there are certain pro- 
found agricultural policies to be inaugurated, which it is no part of this 
paper to develop. There is an unconscious hint in these observations 
that the staple farm products have not during and will not after the 
war be affected equally. Authorities have repeatedly stated, for 
example, that fibers will be longer coming back to the normal, what- 
ever that may be, than food products. Obviously cereals are more 
sensitive to economic changes than meat products. 



80 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



REPORT OF DAVID R. COKER. 



I will confine my report of my observation in England and France 
to a comparatively few points. 

I have been privileged to see parts of the reports of several of the 
other members of the Commission, who are treating at length of the 
general economic situation in England and France and the special 
problems of labor, food and seeds production, and concur in their 
findings, so far as I have been informed of them. 

A few of my most vivid impressions are as follows : 

English agriculture is in most of its departments tremendously 
prosperous, and has not sufl'ered very seriously for lack of labor, Ger- 
man prisoners, land army women (to a limited extent), and Govern- 
ment tractor ploughing having largely taken the place vacated by 
soldiers. The shortage of concentrated feeding stuffs is their most 
complained of handicap just now. French farmers almost everywhere 
outside of the devastated areas are also prosperous, though suffering 
nearly everywhere for labor. 

At Cambridge, and also at several other places in England, I heard 
very flattering reports of a new wheat called "Yeoman," which is a 
hybrid procluced by Professor Biffen of Cambridge, its parentage being 
Canadian Red Fife-Browick (English). I heard reports of its yield- 
ing as high as 100 bushels per acre, which I believe is beyond any pre- 
vious record. Steps should be immediately taken to see whether this 
wheat is adapted to any sections of the United States. 

The most conspicuous instance of businesslike and successful coop- 
erative enterprise which I have ever been privileged to see is the 
cooperative fertilizer factory at Kings Linn, known as the West Norfolk 
Farmers' Manure & Chemical Company, Ltd., operated by the veteran 
chemist, Mr. Thomas Brown, and his son. Profits to shareholders are 
limited to 6 per cent plus one-third of all profits over 6 per cent. Two- 
thirds of all profits over 6 per cent go to shareholding customers in 
proportion to their purchases. The company analyzes chemicals and 
soils and advises their customers on their fertilizer and soil problems. 
The output is 35,000 tons annually. This enterprise will repay study 
fi^om all who are interested in agricultural cooperation. 

The English agricultural rotation, by means of which the lands have 
been improved, has been badly disarranged by the necessity of increas- 
ing the production of bread grains. This, I believe, will react against 
general production of both cereals and live stock in England until the 
normal rotation is resumed. 



REPORT OF DAVID R. COKER. 81 

The restoring of agriculture in the devastated areas of France and 
Belgium is, of course, one of the greatest problems of the war, French 
and English economists believe that the actual work of rebuilding 
should be done by the Germans and with German materials. They 
call attention to the fact that after the Franco-Prussian War Germany 
for several years occupied French territory with large armies of men 
who were badly needed in German industries, while all French labor 
was actively at work. They say that within seven years after the close 
of this war France had increased in wealth more than Germany, 
although the French had been compelled to pay an enormous indem- 
nity. It seems evident that Germam^ should be required to employ 
in the actual labor of reconstruction at least as many men as are used 
by the Allies in occupying conquered territory. They should also be 
required to supply all possible material for reconstruction, besides 
being compelled to return or replace all tools, machinery, and raw 
material taken from the Allies. 

I was much struck with the Frenchman's dependence on wheat 
bread and wine as the basis of his diet. I assume that it will not be 
easy to induce the French to change their long-established dietary. 
The lack of variety of cereals, however, strikes an American who is 
accustomed to a great variety of cereal diet (consisting of wheat, 
corn, rye, rice, and oats prepared in very many different ways) as a 
real hardship, and France's food problems vrould be greatly simplified 
if the people could be induced to adopt some of this variety. Their 
food problems also would be simplified if a large part of their vine- 
yard area were devoted to the iDroduction of food. 

There is practically a fruit famine in England and France (except 
grapes in France) . Prices on apples, for instance, vary from 24 cents 
to 84 cents per pound, wholesale or retail, at different points visited 
in these countries. It would be desirable to encourage the exportation 
of fruit to these countries, if tonnage is available, during the next nine 
months. 

It is the general impression in France and England that the world's 
food supply is not going to be plentiful for several years, the time 
depending upon how long the Central Empires, Kussia, and Roumania 
are in returning to normal production, I think this opinion is well 
grounded, and believe the production of staple foodstuffs in this 
country will be a fairly safe business for at least two years. 

Well-posted experts also are confident that the demand for all kinds 
•of textile fibers will exceed the supply for several years. This appears 
to me to be even more evident than that there will be a food scarcity 
after. 1919, The supply of American cotton in Liverpool when our 
commission sailed was about 100,000 bales, of which only 10,000 were 
unsold. Mill buyers were actively looking over the market for cotton 



82 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

suitable for certain purposes, and were buying from one to five-bale 
lots wherever they could find them. As soon as transportation can 
be found a large amount of cotton should be forwarded to Liverpool, 
Manchester, and other foreign ports, not only to be available for the 
immediate needs of the Allied countries, but to be on hand there for 
export to the Central Empires as soon as they are allowed to handle 
our raw materials. 

While I believe the laws of supply and demand will operate to 
restore cotton to and keep it on a most profitable basis for several 
years, I think it would be advisable for the Department of Agriculture 
to continue to stress the necessity for the production in the cotton 
belt of ample foodstuffs (including live stock) for home consumption. 
I believe the present price at which cotton is selling is much too low. 
This opinion is based on the theory that the war is about to end ; that 
there is an accumulated deficiency of textiles in practically every 
country of the world ; that the past three crops have only been approxi- 
mately equal to the decreased spinning capacity caused by the war, 
and that lack of potash and labor foreshadows another short crop 
in 1919. 

The immediate future of the cotton industry of the United States 
will depend very largely on the transportation situation throughout 
the world. Nothing can be more important than ample ocean tonnage 
and moderate freight rates. 

The comfort, pleasure, and success of our trip was due very largely 
to the energy, tact, and resourcefulness of our chairman. Dr. Thomp- 
son. Mr. Wilmuth, our secretary, was indispensable. He worked 
early and late, and was always at the service of any member. With 
unfailing good humor and genuine business ability he served the 
commission most ably. 

I will be glad to amplify, either in writing or by personal inter- 
view, on any of the subjects which came under my observation while 
abroad. I regret that the efl'ects of a cold and seasickness prevented 
my writing a full report before my landing, and the pressure of 
accumulated affairs at home has necessitated my concentrating this 
communication into a very brief form. 



REPORT OP GEORGE R. ARGO. 83 

REPORT OF GEORGE R. ARGO. 



While I was with the Commission the greater part of the time 
abroad and intensely interested in all phases of the many problems 
which were being-vinvestigated, mj- report will be confined to the 
cotton situation and other questions closely related with which I am 
most familiar. 

England seems to have been a greater sufferer for lack of cotton 
than any of the other Allied countries, owing to the inability to sup- 
ply her enormous spindleage with a sufficient quantity of raw material 
to furnish full-time employment to her mill operatives in the great 
manufacturing cities of Manchester and Lancashire. France has 
not been affected by this shortage to such an extent as England, due 
to the fact that her largest cotton manufacturing city, Lille, has been 
in the hands of the Germans, and her cotton industry has been con- 
fined to the manufacturing section of Normandy, near Havre. Very 
little is known regarding Italy's supply of cotton except that her 
supply is practically exhausted and her needs are claimed to be more 
insistent than France or England on account of a diminished wool 
supply. This question has just been given consideration in London 
at a meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, where the 
cotton pi=ogram for the coming year was presented. Italy asked for 
more cotton for her 1918-19 requirements than was imported during 
the pre-war period based on a seven-year average, while the other 
Allied countries asked for their percentage based on present allotments 
and the lowest quantity that would keep their mills operating. Italy 
was asked to explain why such a large allocation was requested, but 
no satisfactory explanation was forthcoming, though her demand for 
this quantity was quite insistent. The pre-war figures were 136,000 
tons of American cotton and 201,000 tons of all kinds. The Committee 
finally allocated 110,000 tons of American and 60,000 tons of other 
kinds of cotton to Italy, with the promise that if tonnage was avail- 
able a larger quantity would be given, and an investigation is now 
being made to determine Italy's right to a larger allocation of cotton. 

England's cotton mill workers have not benefited as other workers 
by increased wages and additional work, owing to the shortage of raw 
cotton. Mills are restricted to running not more than 50 per cent of 
their spindleage for 451/2 hours per week, and manj^ on less time, 
unless engaged on Government work. The Government has a system 
of remuneration, however, for operatives that are out of employment 
on account of the restrictions in mill operation in order that the 
operatives may be kept at home for work after the war. I was told 



84 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

that the shutting down of mills in Lancashire during the week be- 
ginning October 20 on account of a shortage in cotton cost the Cotton 
Control Board 185,000 pounds sterling. No rationing system to mills 
has 3'et been found necessary, though if supplies of raw cotton should 
become smaller, such a course will have to be adopted. Some cotton 
has been borrowed from one mill to supply another temporarily on 
one or two occasions. 

The textile industry in Belgium and Northern France is believed to 
be entirely destroyed, as the Germans stripped all mills of their 
machinery and removed it to Germany. A great part of this machin- 
ery will in all probability be replaced by the United States, as I am 
told American cotton mill machinery liad been put in some mills in 
Lille just before the outbreak of the war to supplement old-style 
cotton machinery and gave great satisfaction. Many of the mill 
operatives have, of course, left these districts and obtained employ- 
ment elsewhere, and it is an open question as to whether they will re- 
turn to their old work or remain in their present employment. The 
opinion seems to be that the greater number will return as soon as 
reconstruction provides employment for them. 

■ With reference to low-grade cotton, I have official advice that a 
number of cotton mills in England are equipped to use the lowest 
grades of cotton. However, the idea of insisting that a percentage of 
the lower grades be purchased with the higher grades is not pleasing 
to the cotton merchants in Liverpool. They slated that the mills would 
refuse to accept any cotton below middling in grade, and that the low 
grades would be left on their hands and they would be compelled to 
carry the burden. This burden has, of course, been carried by our 
own merchants and farmers for the past two years. A similar situa- 
tion has developed with reference to wool. The best grades in Aus- 
tralia have been taken off the market for the last two years, and a large 
stock of low grades left, which are practically unsalable, as our low- 
grade cotton was last year and is at the present time. The British 
Government has advised representatives of the War Industries Board 
in London that it will be necessary for us to take an "average" 
grade of wool next year. It would seem that such an arrangement 
could applj^ with reference to cotton, though if the present crop is 
of good grade, a smaller percentage than an "average" could be 
allotted with each purchase. England naturally has to absorb much 
Indian cotton now, and it is the lowest grade of cotton produced and 
of the most inferior staple. Before the war Germany and the continent 
absorbed a large proportion of the Indian crop as well as our own low- 
grade cotton. Samples shown me of material that is now being manu- 
factured by England's mills from Indian low-grade cotton, however. 



RErORT OF GEORGE R. ARGO. 85 

indicate that remarkable progress has been made in its use by Eng- 
land. Our low-grade cotton is much superior to Indian cotton, both 
in quality and staple. 

The British Government has fixed a price on Egyptian cotton and 
taken over the entire crop. The price fixed is less than our sea island 
prices, which has resulted in very little sea island being exported 
from this country to Europe. Egyptian cotton is used to a great 
extent by England for airplaine fabric. 

The present scarcity and price of cotton has aroused renewed inter- 
est in Great Britain as to her future source of supply of this product, 
and as soon as hostilities are over every effort will be made by the 
British Government to promote the growth of more cotton in her own 
colonies. Vast irrigation schemes have been planned by the British 
Cotton Growing Association, but owing to the large amount of money 
involved it will take several j'ears to accomplish any definite results. 
We can rest assured, however, that every effort will be made by Great 
Britain to have her future cotton supplies more nearly within her 
own control, especially if the high prices now prevailing continue. 
Much anxiety seems to be prevalent in England with respect to prices 
when peace is declared. It is well known that the Central Powers 
have no cotton; the Entente are at their lowest possible margin, and 
some system of allocating or rationing for a period of time would be 
welcome in order that very high prices might be avoided and each 
country obtain a certain quantity of raw material. 

Mr. Huntington, United States Commercial attache at Petrograd, 
who returned to this country with us, stated to me that the large 
cotton mills in and around Moscow were practically shut down on 
account of being unable to obtain any cotton, and, while he could not 
state positively, he thought very little cotton, comparatively, would 
be produced in Kussia this year. As soon as some satisfactory finan- 
cial arrangements can be made Russia will no doubt want a great deal , 
of cotton. 

The total quantity of raw cotton provided for in the program for 
1919 calls for about 3,600,000 bales for England, France, and Italy. 
This is the minimum that must be supplied to enable their mills to 
keep running and operatives at work on a satisfactory basis. 

Japan has increased her spindleage to a marked extent during the 
last two or three years, and this fact is causing much concern in Eng- 
lish cotton circles with reference to future foreign trade. No definite 
figures as to Japan's present spindleage was obtainable, but her pur- 
chases of cotton in the United States and India indicate that the 
increase in spindleage has been enormous. 

The cotton exchanges in Liverpool and Havre are under restrictions 
which practically make them useless as a hedging medium. This is 



86 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

especially true of Havre, where trading in futures has practically 
ceased. In Liverpool the contract is used largely for straddling opera- 
tions with New York. No spot cotton has been delivered on contract 
since the "war emergency" contract has been in operation. The price 
of American cotton in Liverpool is based on the average price of good 
middling cotton in three Southern markets in the Eastern belt of the 
United States for Eastern cotton and three Western markets for 
Western cotton. The markets now being used for this purpose are 
Norfolk, Augusta, and Savannah, in the East, and Galveston, Houston, 
and Dallas in the West. They have an American Official Valuation 
Committee that fixes a price each day for which cotton may be sold. 
This price includes freight, insurance, etc., and a profit ranging from 
25 to 100 points, according to staple, and 5 per cent additional if it 
can be obtained. No transactions in excess of the fixed price by the 
Valuation Committee are allowed. All purchases and sales of cotton 
must be reported to the Control Committee, and any violation of the 
existing rules is punishable by fine and a possible expulsion from the 
association and deprivation of license. Any excess profit charged, in 
addition to a fine, goes to the Government. The Valuation Committee 
fixes the differences between grades on their own idea as to the value 
of each particular grade, there being no special system except their 
own knowledge of values and reports from our spot markets. In view 
of the fact that spot quotations in Liverpool are based on the quota- 
tions from the designated spot markets, it would seem desirable that 
every precaution possible be taken to insure their correctness. 



SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 87 

SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 



As stated in the report of Chairman Thompson, the Commission as 
a whole presents suggestions and recommendations concerning the 
situation as it existed at the time the observations were made. Since 
then the armistice has been signed and the Peace Conference has been 
called. The suggestions and recommendations, apart from the prob- 
lems which now fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Peace 
Conference, are as follows : 

The Commission, basing its opinion on such observation as it was 
able to make and upon such sources of information as were available, 
affirms the belief that crop conditions and prospects in the principal 
countries of the world justify the statement that for the staple food 
and fiber products grown in the United States, such as wheat, meat, 
sugar, cotton, and wool, there will prevail a strong demand, and that 
j>rices will probably continue steady and at a high level. 

This belief assumes a reasonable provision for shipping facilities 
and a cooperative effort on the part of the Allied Governments to 
organize for production and distribution of staple foods, feeds, and 
fibers. It is also assumed that the war will end before the harvest of 
1919 shall be gathered. The continuance of the war beyond that time 
would project problems into 1920 and 1921 that can not now be fore- 
cast or closely estimated. It is also important to bear in mind that 
the conditions in Russia, Roumania, Germany, and other wheat-pro- 
ducing countries are so unknown and so uncertain that no prediction 
can be made as to the influence of these countries on production and 
markets. One thing seems assured : All these countries involved in 
war will at once become increased consumers when governmental 
restrictions upon food are relaxed. The general situation viewed from 
the standpoint of the American farmer would appear for a reasonable 
period to be both promising and hopeful. 

In the consideration of the varied crop-production problems the 
Commission has been impressed with the extent to which the asso- 
ciated governments of Great Britain and her colonies, France, Italy, 
and the United States have found it necessary as a war measure to 
formulate and put into effect fairly definite programs for the produc- 
tion of essential crops, especially wheat. 

In the wheat-production program of the United States for 1918, and 
in that for 1919, it has been necessary to take into account the forecast 
needs of the allied countries in order to insure the food supply re- 
quired for the winning of the war. From all information available it 
is our opinion that the disorganization of industry, including agricul- 
ture, in the principal wheat-producing countries of Europe is so great 



88 REPORT OP AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 

that several years must elapse before normal production conditions 
are restored. 

As soon as hostilities cease there will be a disposition on the part 
of many American farmers to resume their usual crop systems which 
have proved profitable, but have been abandoned or modified at a 
serious disadvantage in order to assist in the emergency of the wheat 
shortage. A large portion of these farmers will probably feel that 
special efforts on their part are no longer needed. It appears impor- 
tant, therefore, that the United States, as a matter of international 
good will, should take the initiative in requesting the nations now 
associated as belligerents with the United States to join in a program 
of agricultural production that shall embrace the needs of the entire 
world for the next few years, lest a possible serious shortage of food, 
feed, and fiber supplies should dissipate, if not destroy, much of the 
precious fruit hoped for as a result of winning the war. 

The quantities of wheat and other agricultural products that will 
be desired from the United States wall depend not only upon the usual 
factors, but also, and particularly, upon war-made factors which the 
Government of the United States can not alone appro ise or estimate 
before the time to plant for the 1920 harvest. The uncertain factors 
include the resumption of wheat growing in Russia, Roumania, France, 
and other countries; the British policy regarding the maintenance or 
enlargement of their present wheat production program ; the quantity 
and availability of supplies in distant wheat-growing areas, and the 
availability of sufficient tonnage. 

The Commission believes that if there is likely to arise in any allied 
or neutral Government a need for wheat from the 1920 harvest in the 
United States, such Government should make a statement to the 
United States Government not later than May 1, 1919, as to the 
quantity of such wheat desired. 

The Commission believes that unusual risks of overproduction should 
be assumed by wheat-importing nations which would be the sufferers 
in case of underproduction. With fliis principle in mind, the Com- 
mission therefore feels that it is desirable to go a step further in order 
to prevent, so far as practicable, an unbalanced production of wheat 
in the world after the crop of 1919 is harvested. We would suggest 
that steps be taken to have the nations now associated as belligerents 
with the United States determine as accurately as may be, not later 
than May, 1919, what will be the world's needs for wheat from the 
1920 harvest, so that appropriate steps may be taken to insure an 
adequate supply through prompt determination and dissemination of 
international information regarding crop prospects and conditions, 
and such other steps as may be found necessary to insure adequate 



I 



I 



SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 89 

production of wheat during the crucial period of post-war readjust- 
ment of industry in the affected nations. A similar arrangement 
might well be considered in reference to meat supplies, sugar, cotton, 
and wool. 

The Commission further suggests that these and related subjects 
might be given adequate consideration if an inter-allied Agricultural 
Council were provided, and recommends that steps be taken for the 
creation of such a council, on which the member from the United 
States should be the Secretary of Agriculture. 



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